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ABSTRACT
In the Supreme Court’s 2014 decision in Lexmark International, Inc. v. Static Control
Components, Inc., Justice Antonin Scalia writing for a unanimous Court partially achieved his
goal of abolishing the prudential standing doctrine. First, the Court concluded that the zone of
interests test concerns whether Congress has authorized a particular plaintiff to sue and is not a
prudential standing question despite several Court decisions classifying it as such. However, there
is a continuing controversy in the D.C. Circuit about applying the test to suits by competitors,
especially in environmental cases. The better approach is to allow competitor standing in at least
some environmental cases because even self-interested suits may advance the environmental
purposes of the applicable statutes. Second, the Court held that its limitations on “generalized
grievances” suits is based on constitutional Article III standing requirements and not the
prudential standing principles relied in some of the Court’s previous cases. Yet it is not clear that
treating limitations on “generalized grievances” as Article III standing requirements will preclude
taxpayer suits, voting rights cases or climate change litigation, especially if the Court’s composition
changes. Finally, the Court did not resolve the issue of whether limitations on third-party standing
are based on prudential standing or other grounds. If the Court precludes third-party suits,
however, it should recognize that some challengers have a sufficient personal Article III injury in
protecting the various constitutional rights at issue in those cases, although the differing
circumstances in various third-party standing cases likely preclude a single easy rule. Justice
Scalia in theory eliminated two of the three major prongs of prudential standing endorsed by the
Court in a 2004 decision. However, a more liberal future Supreme Court might
be able to revive
1
prudential standing in practice, if not name, without overruling Lexmark.

*

1

James Helmer, Jr. Professor of Law, University of Cincinnati College of Law, P.O. Box
210040, University of Cincinnati, Cincinnati, Ohio 45221-0040, Telephone 513-556-0094,
Fax 513-556-1236, e-mail: brad.mank@uc.edu. I thank Michael Solimine and my other faculty colleagues attending a June 2014 presentation of an early draft of this Article. All errors or omissions are my responsibility.
This Article is one of a series of explorations of modern standing doctrines. The other
pieces are (1) Bradford C. Mank, Should States Have Greater Standing Rights Than Ordinary
Citizens?: Massachusetts v. EPA’s New Standing Test for States, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1701
(2008) [hereinafter Mank, States Standing]; (2) Bradford C. Mank, Standing and Future
Generations: Does Massachusetts v. EPA Open Standing for Generations to Come?, 34 COLUM. J.
ENVTL. L. 1 (2009); (3) Bradford C. Mank, Standing and Statistical Persons: A Risk-Based
Approach to Standing, 36 ECOLOGY L.Q. 665 (2009) [hereinafter Mank, Standing and Statistical Persons]; (4) Bradford C. Mank, Summers v. Earth Island Institute Rejects Probabilistic
Standing, But a “Realistic Threat” of Harm is a Better Standing Test, 40 ENVTL. L. 89 (2010);
(5) Bradford C. Mank, Revisiting the Lyons Den: Summers v. Earth Island Institute’s Misuse
of Lyons’s “Realistic Threat” of Harm Standing Test, 42 ARIZ. ST. L.J 837 (2010); (6) Bradford
C. Mank, Summers v. Earth Island Institute: Its Implications for Future Standing Decisions, 40

213

214

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 18:1

TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION ............................................................................. 215
I. INTRODUCTION TO CONSTITUTIONAL AND PRUDENTIAL
STANDING............................................................................... 218
A. Constitutional Article III Standing ...................................218
B. The Controversial Prudential Standing Doctrine Before
Lexmark ....................................................................220
1. The Court’s Pre-Lexmark Prudential Standing
Doctrine ............................................................... 220
2. Criticisms of Prudential Standing Doctrine ................. 225
II. LEXMARK .................................................................................. 227
A. Basic Facts of the Lexmark Litigation ..............................227
B. Prudential Standing in Lexmark ....................................228
C. The Zone of Interests in General and in Lexmark ..............230
III. WHETHER THE USUAL RULE AGAINST GENERALIZED
GRIEVANCES IS A PRUDENTIAL OR ARTICLE III BARRIER
AND HOW BROAD IS THE BARRIER ......................................... 231
A. Taxpayer Suits Are Usually Prohibited Because They Are
Generalized Grievances, But Lexmark Fails to Prohibit All
Taxpayer Suits .............................................................231
B. The Prohibition Against Generalized Grievances Not
Involving Taxpayer Suits...............................................234

ENVTL. L. REP. 10958 (Oct. 2010); (7) Bradford C. Mank, Standing in Monsanto Co. v.
Geertson Seed Farms: Using Economic Injury as a Basis for Standing When Environmental
Harm is Difficult to Prove, 115 PENN ST. L. REV. 307 (2010); (8) Bradford C. Mank, Informational Standing After Summers, 39 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 1 (2012); (9) Bradford C.
Mank, Reading the Standing Tea Leaves in American Electric Power v. Connecticut, 46 U.
RICH. L. REV. 543 (2012) [hereinafter Mank, Tea Leaves]; (10) Bradford C. Mank, Judge
Posner’s “Practical” Theory of Standing: Closer to Justice Breyer’s Approach to Standing than Justice
Scalia’s, 50 HOUS. L. REV. 71 (2012) [Mank, Judge Posner’s “Practical” Theory of Standing];
(11) Bradford C. Mank, Standing for Private Parties in Global Warming Cases: Traceable Standing Causation Does Not Require Proximate Causation, 2012 MICH. ST. L. REV. 869 (2012)
[hereinafter Mank, Standing for Private Parties in Global Warming Cases]; (12) Bradford C.
Mank, Is Prudential Standing Jurisdictional?, 64 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 413 (2013); (13) Bradford C. Mank, Clapper v. Amnesty International: Two or Three Competing Philosophies of
Standing Law?, 81 TENN. L. REV. 211 (2014); (14) Bradford C. Mank, No Article III Standing
for Private Plaintiffs Challenging State Greenhouse Gas Regulations: The Ninth Circuit’s Decision
in Washington Environmental Council v. Bellon, 63 AM. U. L. REV. 1525 (2014) [hereinafter Mank, No Article III Standing for Private Plaintiffs]; (15) Does United States v. Windsor
(the DOMA case) Open the Door to Congressional Standing Rights?, 76 U. PITT. L. REV. 1 (2014).

Oct. 2015]

PRUDENTIAL STANDING DOCTRINE

215

C. Climate Change Suits By States May Not Be Generalized
Grievances ...................................................................238
IV. ZONE OF INTERESTS ................................................................ 242
A. Pre-Lexmark Cases Treat the Zone of Interests as
Prudential ...................................................................242
B. Lexmark Defines the Zone of Interests as Determining
Which Plaintiffs Congress Intended To Have the Right to
Sue .............................................................................245
C. The Battle in the D.C. Circuit Regarding Competitor
Standing .....................................................................247
1. Hazardous Waste Treatment Council v. EPA ........ 248
2. Clean Air Act Cases................................................. 249
3. White Stallion Energy Center..................................... 251
V. THIRD-PARTY STANDING AND RELATED ISSUES: PRUDENTIAL
STANDING OR SOMETHING ELSE?........................................... 257
CONCLUSION................................................................................. 261
INTRODUCTION
Until 2014, the Supreme Court distinguished between mandatory
2
Article III standing requirements and discretionary court-imposed
3
prudential standing considerations. However, in a 1983 law review
article, Justice Antonin Scalia, then a judge on the Federal Court of
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, argued that the prudential standing
doctrine was problematic because there was no legal basis for giving
judges discretionary authority to reject otherwise lawful cases and that
federal courts should abolish the doctrine to rely solely on constitu4
tional standing principles. In the Supreme Court’s 2014 decision in
Lexmark International, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., Justice Scal5
ia writing for a unanimous Court partially achieved his goal of abol6
ishing the prudential standing doctrine. However, a more liberal future Supreme Court might be able to revive prudential standing in
7
practice, if not name, without overruling Lexmark.
2
3

4

See infra Part I.A.
Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 12 (2004), partially abrogated by
Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377, 1386–88 & n.3
(2014); see infra Part I.A.
See Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation of Powers,
17 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 881, 885 (1983); see also Mank, Judge Posner’s “Practical” Theory of
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First, the Lexmark decision concluded that the zone of interests
test concerns whether Congress has authorized a particular plaintiff
to sue and is not a prudential standing question despite several Court
8
decisions classifying it as such. However, there is a continuing controversy in the D.C. Circuit about applying the test to suits by compet9
itors, especially in environmental cases. The better approach is to
allow competitor standing in at least some environmental cases because even self-interested suits may advance the environmental pur10
poses of the relevant statutes. Because it involves a case by case determination of statutory intent, the zone of interests test formulated
by Justice Scalia in Lexmark is likely to survive even after his departure
from the Court, but a future Court might interpret the test more lib11
erally than Justice Scalia without overruling Lexmark.

5

6
7
8
9
10
11

Standing, supra note 1 at 106–07 (discussing Justice Scalia’s 1983 article’s criticism of prudential standing doctrine).
During the 2013–2014 Supreme Court term, from October 2013 through June 2014, “the
Supreme Court justices voted unanimously in 65 percent of orally argued cases—the
highest share since at least 1953” “and those cases revealed signs of compromise and restraint, which many Supreme Court specialists said was a testament to the leadership of
Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr.” Adam Liptak, Compromise at the Supreme Court Veils Its
Rifts, N.Y. Times, July 1, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/02/us/supreme-courtterm-marked-by-unanimous-decisions.html?hpw&action=click&pgtype=Homepage
&version=HpHedThumbWell&module=well-region&region=bottom-well&WT.nav=
bottom-well&_r=0. In Lexmark International, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., the
Court was able to achieve unanimity in part by avoiding the controversial issue of thirdparty standing. 134 S. Ct. at 1387 & n.3; see infra Part V.
Lexmark, 134 S. Ct. at 1386–88, 1387 n.3.
See infra Parts III–V and Conclusion.
Lexmark, 134 S. Ct. at 1386–88 & nn.3–4.
See infra Part IV.C.
See infra Part IV.C.
See infra Part IV.B.
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Second, the Court held that its limitations on “generalized grievances” suits are based on constitutional Article III standing requirements and not the prudential standing principles relied on some of
12
The prohibition against generalized
the Court’s previous cases.
grievances most notably bars suits based solely on a plaintiff’s status as
13
a federal taxpayer, but also addresses other types of suits in which
the alleged harm affects large numbers of or all American citizens or
14
voters. Yet the Lexmark decision did not explicitly prohibit all taxpayer suits despite Justice Scalia’s likely desire for such a result, and,
therefore, a future Supreme Court could revive taxpayer suits in some
15
circumstances. Furthermore, the Court could continue to allow certain suits by voters or climate change suits that a minority of the
Court, including Justice Scalia, view as generalized grievances that are
16
prohibited by Article III.
Finally, the Court did not resolve the issue of whether limitations
on third-party standing are based on prudential standing or other
17
grounds. The doctrine of third-party standing is complicated because it involves several different types of suits that cannot be easily
treated as similar, and, therefore, there may not be a simple standing
18
answer for all third-party suits. If the Court precludes third-party
suits, however, it should recognize that some challengers have a sufficient personal Article III injury in protecting the various constitu19
tional rights at issue to sue on their own standing in those cases.
Justice Scalia did not win a complete victory against prudential
standing in Lexmark. However, in theory he eliminated two of the
three major prongs of prudential standing endorsed by the Court in a
20
2004 decision. Nevertheless, a more liberal future Supreme Court
could revive particular prudential standing practices, such as allowing
some taxpayer suits, without overruling Lexmark, or allow more liberal
21
competitor standing than is the current practice in the D.C. Circuit.
Part I explains the basic principles of constitutional Article III
standing and the more controversial doctrine of prudential standing.
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21

Lexmark, 134 S. Ct. at 1387 & n.3.
See infra Part III.A.
See infra Parts III.B–C.
See infra Part III.A.
See infra Parts III.B–C.
See infra Part V.
Lexmark, 134 S. Ct. at 1387 & n.3.
Id.
Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist., 542 U.S. at 12, partially abrogated by Lexmark, 134 S. Ct. at 1386–
88, 1387 & n.3; see infra Part I.A.
See infra Parts III, IV and Conclusion.
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Part II discusses how the Lexmark decision changed the prudential
standing doctrine. Part III examines the complicated history of
whether the Supreme Court’s reluctance to hear, and partial prohibition against “generalized grievances” suits, is based on prudential
standing principles or constitutional Article III standing requirements, how Lexmark squarely concluded that Article III standing doctrine governs the issue, and why Lexmark may not prohibit all suits
that are arguably generalized grievances. Part IV examines the history of the zone of interests test, how Lexmark determined that the zone
of interests test is not a prudential standing issue, and why Lexmark
did not resolve the contentious issue in the D.C. Circuit regarding
whether and when economic competitors met the zone of interests
test. Part V explains the Court’s usual, but not complete, prohibition
against third-party suits, and explores how it may be possible to recognize suits by some, but not all, third parties as having a sufficient
personal interest in the suit. The conclusion tries to assess how significantly Lexmark changed prudential standing doctrine, and which important issues remain unresolved by that decision.
22
I. INTRODUCTION TO CONSTITUTIONAL AND PRUDENTIAL STANDING

A. Constitutional Article III Standing
Although the Constitution does not explicitly require that each
plaintiff establish “standing” to file suit in federal court, the Supreme
Court has inferred from Article III’s restriction of judicial decisions to
“Cases” and “Controversies” that federal courts must impose standing
requirements to confirm that a plaintiff has a genuine interest in the
23
outcome of a case. For a federal court to have jurisdiction over a
22
23

The discussion of standing in Part I relies upon my earlier standing articles cited in note
1.
The constitutional standing requirements are derived from Article III, section 2, which
provides:
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this
Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be
made, under their Authority;—to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public
Ministers and Consuls;—to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;—to
Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party;—to Controversies between two or more States;—between a State and Citizens of another State; between
Citizens of different States;—between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands
under Grants of different States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and
foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; see DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 340–41 (2006)
(explaining why the Supreme Court infers that Article III’s case and controversy requirement necessitates standing limitations). See generally Michael E. Solimine, Congress,
Separation of Powers and Standing, 59 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1023, 1036–38 (2009) (discuss-
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case, at least one plaintiff must demonstrate it has standing for each
24
form of relief sought. Federal courts must dismiss a case for lack of
jurisdiction if no plaintiff meets constitutional Article III standing re25
quirements.
Standing requirements are grounded in constitutional principles.
26
Standing doctrine prevents unconstitutional advisory opinions. Additionally, standing requirements are consistent with separation of
powers principles delimiting the division of powers between the judiciary and political branches of government so that the “Federal Judiciary respects the proper—and properly limited—role of the courts
27
in a democratic society.” Individual members of the Supreme Court
have disagreed, however, regarding the extent to which separation of
powers principles limit Congress’s authority to authorize standing to
sue in federal courts for private citizen suits challenging executive
28
branch decisions.
The Supreme Court has formulated a three-part test for constitutional Article III standing that requires a plaintiff to establish that:
(1) he has “suffered an injury-in-fact,” which is (a) “concrete and particularized” and (b) “actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypo-

24

25

26

27
28

ing a scholarly debate on whether the Framers intended the Constitution to require
standing to sue).
See DaimlerChrysler, 547 U.S. at 351–52 (confirming that “a plaintiff must demonstrate
standing separately for each form of relief sought” (quoting Friends of the Earth, Inc. v.
Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 185 (2000))).
See id. at 340–41 (emphasizing the importance of the case or controversy requirement);
Friends of the Earth, 528 U.S. at 180 (adding that courts have an affirmative duty at the outset of the litigation to ensure that litigants satisfy all Article III standing requirements).
See Chafin v. Chafin, 133 S. Ct. 1017, 1023 (2013) (“Article III of the Constitution restricts
the power of federal courts to ‘Cases’ and ‘Controversies.’ Accordingly, ‘[t]o invoke the
jurisdiction of a federal court, a litigant must have suffered, or be threatened with, an actual injury traceable to the defendant and likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial
decision.’ Federal courts may not ‘decide questions that cannot affect the rights of litigants in the case before them or give opinion[s] advising what the law would be upon a
hypothetical state of facts.’” (citations omitted)).
DaimlerChrysler, 547 U.S. at 341 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
Compare Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 573–78 (1992) (concluding that
Articles II and III of the Constitution limit Congress’s authority to authorize citizen suits
by any person lacking a concrete injury and citing several recent Supreme Court decisions for support), with id. at 580 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“Congress has the power to
define injuries and articulate chains of causation that will give rise to a case or controversy
where none existed before….”); id. at 602 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (arguing that the
“principal effect” of the majority’s approach to standing was “to transfer power into the
hands of the Executive at the expense—not of the courts—but of Congress, from which
that power originates and emanates”). See generally Heather Elliott, The Functions of Standing, 61 STAN. L. REV. 459, 496 (2008) (suggesting the “disagreement” is “[u]nsurprising[]”
and arguing that courts should not use standing doctrine as “a backdoor way to limit
Congress’s legislative power”).
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thetical”; (2) “there [is] a causal connection between the injury and
the conduct complained of—the injury has to be fair29
ly . . . trace[able] to the challenged action of the defendant, and
not . . . th[e] result [of] the independent action of some third party
not before the court”; and (3) “it [is] likely, as opposed to merely
30
speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.”
The plaintiff bears the burden of proof for all three prongs of consti31
tutional Article III standing.
B. The Controversial Prudential Standing Doctrine Before Lexmark
1. The Court’s Pre-Lexmark Prudential Standing Doctrine
Before the Lexmark decision in 2014, federal courts had imposed
prudential standing considerations to limit unreasonable demands
on limited judicial resources or for other judicial policy reasons to
prohibit suits in federal courts even if a plaintiff met constitutional
32
Article III standing requirements. Before its Lexmark decision, the
Supreme Court had identified three major parts to the prudential
standing doctrine:
Although we have not exhaustively defined the prudential dimensions of
the standing doctrine, we have explained that prudential standing encompasses “the general prohibition on a litigant’s raising another person’s legal rights, the rule barring adjudication of generalized grievances
more appropriately addressed in the representative branches, and the
requirement that a plaintiff’s complaint fall within the zone of interests
33
protected by the law invoked.”

29

30
31

32

33

The Lexmark decision explained the distinction between the standing requirement of fairly traceable causation and the ultimate question of proving proximate causation on the
merits as follows: “Proximate causation is not a requirement of Article III standing, which
requires only that the plaintiff’s injury be fairly traceable to the defendant’s conduct.”
Lexmark, 134 S. Ct. at 1391 n.6.
Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560–61 (second, third, and fourth alterations in original) (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted).
DaimlerChrysler, 547 U.S. at 342 (stating that parties asserting federal jurisdiction must
“carry the burden of establishing their standing under Article III”); Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561
(same); see also LARRY W. YACKLE, FEDERAL COURTS 336 (3d ed. 2009) (explaining that a
plaintiff at the summary judgment stage must ultimately prove the existence of injury,
causation, and redressability).
See, e.g., Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 162–63 (1997) (describing the zone of interests
standard as a “prudential limitation” rather than a mandatory constitutional requirement); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 97 (1968) (stating that prudential requirements are
based “in policy, rather than purely constitutional, considerations”); YACKLE, supra note
31, at 318 (stating that prudential limitations are policy-based).
Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist., 542 U.S. at 12 (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751
(1984), partially abrogated by Lexmark, 134 S. Ct. 1377; see also S. Todd Brown, The Story of
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Even before the Court’s Lexmark decision, however, the Court in
some decisions had based the prohibition against generalized griev34
ances on Article III rather than prudential concerns. The distinction between constitutional Article III and prudential standing matters because Congress may enact legislation to override courtimposed prudential limitations, but may not do so for constitutional
35
standing requirements.
Prior to its Lexmark decision, the Court had been inconsistent in at
least two decisions regarding whether the prudential standing doctrine was as important as constitutional Article III standing requirements in protecting core separation of powers principles and, therefore, whether prudential standing was a mandatory jurisdictional
issue that required dismissal of a case from the federal courts if a
plaintiff’s suit was contrary to prudential standing principles, alt36
hough the language in these two decisions is arguably dicta. First,
the Court in its 1975 decision in Warth v. Seldin implied that prudential standing doctrine is crucial in preventing federal courts from addressing political questions more appropriately addressed by the political branches, but the decision did not explicitly address whether
prudential standing is a jurisdictional issue:
Without such limitations—closely related to Art. III concerns but essentially matters of judicial self-governance—the courts would be called upon to decide abstract questions of wide public significance even though

34

35

36

Prudential Standing, 42 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 95, 95, 101, 109–15, 118–24 (2014) (discussing three main types of prudential standing used before 2014: (1) zone of interests; (2)
generalized grievances; and (3) third-party standing; but observing courts have recognized some other miscellaneous prudential standing issues).
See, e.g., Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 587, 599 (2007) (“We have
consistently held that [the interest of a federal taxpayer in seeing that Treasury funds are
spent in accordance with the Constitution] is too generalized and attenuated to support
Article III standing.”); Lujan, 504 U.S. at 573–74 (“We have consistently held that a plaintiff raising only a generally available grievance about government—claiming only harm to
his and every citizen’s interest in proper application of the Constitution and laws, and
seeking relief that no more directly and tangibly benefits him than it does the public at
large—does not state an Article III case or controversy.”); Brown, supra note 33, at 109–10
(observing that Supreme Court originally treated generalized grievances as prudential issue, but later as a constitutional issue).
Bennett, 520 U.S. at 162–66 (explaining that “unlike their constitutional counterparts,
[prudential limits on standing] can be modified or abrogated by Congress,” that prudential limitations must be “expressly negated” and concluding that a citizen suit provision
abrogated the zone of interests limitation); Mank, Standing and Statistical Persons, supra
note 1, at 676 & n.53 (same). The Court’s requirement that Congress use express statutory language to override the Court’s prudential standing rules probably does not necessitate the extraordinary specificity demanded by a clear statement rule of statutory construction. YACKLE, supra note 31, at 386 n.493.
See Mank, Is Prudential Standing Jurisdictional?, supra note 1, at 426–29.
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other governmental institutions may be more competent to address the
questions and even though judicial intervention may be unnecessary to
37
protect individual rights.

In Thompson v. County of Franklin, the Second Circuit interpreted the
above quoted language in Warth to determine that prudential standing issues affect a federal court’s subject matter jurisdiction and, accordingly, that it had a duty to sua sponte examine prudential stand38
ing issues despite the failure of the parties to raise the question.
Contrarily, in its 1984 decision in Allen v. Wright, the Supreme
Court concluded that Article III standing is “perhaps the most important” of the case-or-controversy doctrines including “mootness,
39
ripeness, political question, and the like.” The Allen decision implied that Article III standing, as a “core component” of standing “derived directly from the Constitution,” is a more fundamental constitutional core requirement than prudential standing doctrines, stating:
Standing doctrine embraces several judicially self-imposed limits on the
exercise of federal jurisdiction, such as the general prohibition on a litigant’s raising another person’s legal rights, the rule barring adjudication
of generalized grievances more appropriately addressed in the representative branches, and the requirement that a plaintiff’s complaint fall
within the zone of interests protected by the law invoked. The requirement of standing, however, has a core component derived directly from
the Constitution. A plaintiff must allege personal injury fairly traceable
to the defendant’s allegedly unlawful conduct and likely to be redressed
40
by the requested relief.

In Alliance for Environmental Renewal, Inc. v. Pyramid Crossgates Co., the
Second Circuit interpreted the Allen decision as treating Article III
standing as “[m]ore fundamental than judicially imposed, prudential
41
limits on the exercise of federal jurisdiction.”
The Supreme Court’s pre-Lexmark prudential standing doctrine
was arguably less clear and more open to interpretation than the Ar-

37
38
39

40

41

Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975), partially abrogated by Lexmark, 134 S. Ct. 1377.
15 F.3d 245, 248–49 (2d Cir. 1994).
468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984); see also Alliance for Envtl. Renewal, Inc. v. Pyramid Crossgates
Co., 436 F.3d 82, 85 (2d Cir. 2006) (discussing Allen v. Wright’s emphasis that Article III
standing is the most important of the case-or-controversy doctrines).
Allen, 468 U.S. at 751 (citation omitted); accord Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 475 (1982) (“[The Article III requirement] states a limitation on judicial power, not merely a factor to be balanced in the
weighing of so-called ‘prudential’ considerations.”); Alliance for Envtl. Renewal, Inc., 436
F.3d at 85 (discussing Allen v. Wright’s suggestion that Article III standing is more important than prudential standing).
Id.
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ticle III constitutional standing doctrine discussed earlier in Part I.A.42
In Elk Grove Unified School District v. Newdow, the Supreme Court in
2004 conceded that “we have not exhaustively defined the prudential
43
dimensions of the standing doctrine.” In Newdow, the Court dismissed an Establishment Clause suit filed by the father of an elementary school student challenging the constitutionality of a school district’s policy requiring teacher-led recitation of the Pledge of
Allegiance because of prudential standing concerns about the appropriateness of federal courts “entertain[ing] a claim by a plaintiff
whose standing to sue is founded on family law rights that are in dispute when prosecution of the lawsuit may have an adverse effect on
44
the person who is the source of the plaintiff’s claimed standing.”
The child’s mother, who was the custodial parent, intervened in the
suit to dismiss the complaint and disputed the father’s right to influ45
ence his daughter’s religious upbringing under California law. Because of these family law issues, a majority determined that the Court
should invoke prudential standing principles to avoid a case involving
difficult family law issues governed by California domestic relations
46
law. In his concurring opinion, Chief Justice William Rehnquist,
who was joined by Justices Sandra Day O’Connor and Clarence
Thomas, complained that the majority had created a “new prudential
standing principle” based on “ad hoc improvisations” to dismiss a
troublesome case and should instead formulate “general principles”
47
for prudential standing.
48
Both Newdow and the more recent Windsor decision demonstrate
that there were sometimes considerable disagreements on the Court
before the Lexmark decision about how to apply prudential standing
49
principles. In its 2013 decision United States v. Windsor, decided just
a year before Lexmark and with the same nine Justices serving on the
Court, the majority opinion by Justice Anthony Kennedy suggested
the usual requirement that the parties be truly adverse in their posi-

42

43
44
45
46
47
48
49

See Gregory Bradford, Note, Simplifying State Standing: The Role of Sovereign Interests in Future Climate Litigation, 52 B.C. L REV. 1065, 1079 (2011) (describing prudential standing
doctrine as “a malleable framework”).
542 U.S. 1, 12 (2004).
Id. at 17.
Id. at 13–17; Mank, Is Prudential Standing Jurisdictional?, supra note 1, at 423.
Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist., 542 U.S. at 12–17; see also Mank, Is Prudential Standing Jurisdictional?, supra note 1, at 423.
Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist., 542 U.S. at 18–25 (Rehnquist, J., concurring); Mank, Is Prudential Standing Jurisdictional?, supra note 1, at 423.
See Bradford, supra note 42, at 1079–80.
133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
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tions is a flexible prudential standing principle that can be waived in
certain circumstances if non-parties filing amicus briefs provide suffi50
cient critical arguments. The Court concluded that the House of
Representatives leadership’s amicus brief had sufficiently supported
the constitutionality of a statute denying government benefits to same
sex married couples to create an adverse case fit for judicial resolution despite the executive branch’s unwillingness to defend the con51
stitutionality of the statute. However, the dissenting opinion by Justice Scalia argued that the requirement of adverseness was instead
mandated by constitutional Article III principles and that majority’s
treatment of the issue as prudential in nature was motivated by issues
of convenience so that the Court could decide the case on the merits
and not dismiss a case in which the government and the challenger
52
Windsor involved a
agreed that the statute was unconstitutional.
53
challenge to Section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act (“DOMA”),
which excluded same-sex married partners from numerous federal
54
laws otherwise applicable to lawfully married spouses. In particular,
the Court held that the United States met Article III standing because, despite its agreement with the lower court’s ruling, the United
States had not refunded the money to which Edie Windsor was enti55
tled under that ruling and thus suffered an economic injury. Additionally, the Court found it appropriate to permit arguments provided in an amicus brief by the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group
(“BLAG”), which represented a majority of the House of Representatives leaders, supporting DOMA to satisfy the prudential concerns
that the United States and Windsor were “friendly” parties and, therefore, that BLAG’s participation supplied the necessary “adverseness”
required to have a justiciable controversy suitable for resolution by
56
federal courts.

50
51
52

53
54
55
56

Id. at 2687; see also Mank, Is Prudential Standing Jurisdictional?, supra note 1, at 422–23, 428.
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2687.
Id. at 2701 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Relegating a jurisdictional requirement to ‘prudential’
status is a wondrous device, enabling courts to ignore the requirement whenever they believe it ‘prudent’—which is to say, a good idea.”).
1 U.S.C. § 7 (2012), invalidated by United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
Id.
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2686.
Id. at 2687–88 (citing other cases where the Court has entertained adversarial arguments
from nonparties).
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2. Criticisms of Prudential Standing Doctrine
In a 1983 law review article authored when he was serving as a
judge on the D.C. Circuit, now-Justice Scalia doubted the validity of
“the so-called ‘prudential limitations of standing’ allegedly imposed
by the Court itself, subject to elimination by the Court or by Con57
gress.” He questioned whether any prudential standing principles
not based on constitutional standing are valid, asserting, “I find this
bifurcation [between prudential and constitutional standing] unsatisfying—not least because it leaves unexplained the Court’s source of
authority for simply granting or denying standing as its prudence
58
might dictate.” Justice Scalia has followed a judicial philosophy in
which he believes that federal courts are bound by the original intent
of the Framers of the Constitution and may not exercise judicial au59
thority outside the scope of Article III’s provisions. In his 1983 article, he contended that the “judicial doctrine of standing is a crucial
and inseparable element” of separation of powers principles required
by the structure and original intent of the Constitution, which provides boundaries for the respective exercise of legislative, executive
60
and judicial powers. Because authority for flexible prudential judicial decisionmaking is not contained in Article III, then-Judge Scalia
suggested that federal courts should eliminate prudential standing
doctrine and hear all cases for which there is constitutional standing:
“as I would prefer to view the matter, the Court must always hear the

57

58
59

60

See Scalia, supra note 4, at 885; see also Brown, supra note 33, at 128–33 (arguing courts
should abolish prudential standing doctrine because federal courts have duty to hear all
cases for which they have constitutional standing jurisdiction); Mank, Judge Posner’s “Practical” Theory of Standing, supra note 1, at 106–07 (discussing Justice Scalia’s 1983 article’s
criticism of prudential standing doctrine).
Scalia, supra note 4, at 885.
Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United States Federal
Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE LAW 44.47 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997) [hereinafter Scalia, Common-Law
Courts in a Civil-Law System] (supporting an originalist approach to constitutional interpretation); Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 851–62
(1989) [hereinafter Scalia, Originalism] (defending originalist approach to constitutional
interpretation but acknowledging some difficulties); see also Mank, Judge Posner’s “Practical” Theory of Standing, supra note 1, at 105–06 (discussing Justice Scalia’s approach to constitutional originalism, including that he is a “fainthearted originalist” who acknowledges
that originalist principles may have to yield in some cases to pragmatic concerns about
adhering to longstanding judicial precedent).
Scalia, supra note 4, at 881; see also Mank, Judge Posner’s “Practical” Theory of Standing, supra
note 1, at 104.
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case of a litigant who asserts the violation of a legal right.” 61 Before
the Lexmark decision, Justice Scalia did not directly call for the aboli62
tion of prudential standing, but in cases where the line between
constitutional and prudential standing is questionable, he prefers to
63
categorize issues as constitutional standing rather than prudential.
In Hein v. Freedom from Religion Foundation, Inc., Justice Scalia in his
concurring opinion, which was joined by Justice Thomas, contended
64
that the Court should overrule its 1968 decision in Flast v. Cohen,
which suggested that the prohibition against taxpayer standing is
65
prudential rather than constitutional, and clearly declare that the
bar against taxpayer standing is constitutional and not just pruden66
tial.
Besides Justice Scalia, other commentators have made various criticisms of the Court’s prudential standing doctrines. Some commentators have argued that the line separating constitutional Article III
67
standing doctrine from prudential standing doctrine is often murky.
For example, as is discussed in Part III, the Court for many years did
not clearly explain whether the general prohibition against taxpayer
suits was a principle based on prudential standing doctrine or consti68
tutional Article III principles. Furthermore, Dean Erwin Chemerinsky has contended that the Court sometimes manipulates arbitrary
distinctions between constitutional Article III standing and pruden61

62
63
64
65

66

67

68

Scalia, supra note 4, at 885; see also Mank, Judge Posner’s “Practical” Theory of Standing, supra
note 1, at 106–07 (discussing Justice Scalia’s 1983 article’s criticism of prudential standing
doctrine).
Mank, Judge Posner’s “Practical” Theory of Standing, supra note 1, at 106–07 (discussing Justice Scalia’s 1983 article’s criticism of prudential standing doctrine).
Mank, Is Prudential Standing Jurisdictional?, supra note 1, at 425.
392 U.S. 83 (1968).
Id. at 92–94; Solimine, supra note 23, at 1042 (suggesting that Flast v. Cohen interpreted
the Frothingham decision generally prohibiting taxpayer suits as a prudential rather than
constitutional standing case).
Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 587, 618–37, 634 n.5 (2007); accord
Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 131 S. Ct. 1436, 1449–50 (2011) (Scalia, J., concurring) (reiterating his view in Hein that the Court should overrule Flast and reject taxpayer standing on constitutional grounds); see also Mank, Is Prudential Standing Jurisdictional?, supra note 1, at 425; Solimine, supra note 23, at 1045.
Erwin Chemerinsky, A Unified Approach to Justiciability, 22 CONN. L. REV. 677, 692 (1990)
(arguing that the Court’s distinction between prudential and constitutional standing is
often arbitrary); see Brown, supra note 33, at 96–97, 108–15, 124–27 (2014) (same); Craig
A. Stern, Another Sign from Hein: Does the Generalized Grievance Fail a Constitutional or a Prudential Test of Federal Standing to Sue?, 12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1169, 1173 (2008) (arguing that the Court sometimes shifts line between prudential and constitutional standing,
especially in generalized grievances cases); see also Mank, Is Prudential Standing Jurisdictional?, supra note 1, at 423–33.
See infra Part III.
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tial standing for its convenience to reach desired policy results with69
out any genuine logical basis. A recent possible example of the manipulation of standing doctrine to achieve policy results is the Windsor
majority’s treatment of adverseness as a prudential rather than a constitutional Article III requirement because of its desire to have the
Supreme Court quickly resolve the question of DOMA’s constitution70
ality. In light of the Lexmark decision, Professor Richard H. Fallon,
Jr. has argued that rather than explicitly invoke controversial prudential considerations to authorize or avoid considering certain cases,
some Justices might subtly alter the three-part constitutional standing
71
test to achieve the same results.
II. LEXMARK
A. Basic Facts of the Lexmark Litigation
72
Lexmark sells the only type of toner cartridges that work with the
company’s laser printers; however, “remanufacturers” acquire and refurbish used Lexmark cartridges to sell in competition with
73
Lexmark’s own new and refurbished ones. To discourage its customers from dealing with remanufacturers, Lexmark’s “Prebate” program gives customers a discount on new cartridges if they agree to re74
To enforce the Prebate
turn empty cartridges to the company.
terms, Lexmark inserts into each Prebate cartridge a microchip that
75
disables the empty cartridge unless Lexmark replaces the chip.

69

70
71

72
73
74
75

Chemerinsky, supra note 67, at 692 (“The only apparent answer sounds terribly cynical: a
requirement is constitutional if the Court says it is, and it is prudential if the Court says it
is that. Nothing in the content of the doctrines explains their constitutional or prudential status.”); but see Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499–500 (1975) (explaining reasoning
for prudential rules against third-party standing and generalized grievance), partially abrogated by Lexmark, 134 S. Ct. 1377.
United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2701 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Fragmentation of Standing, 93 TEX. L. REV. 1061, 1106–07 (2015)
(“Notwithstanding the Court’s evident unease in Lexmark with formal recognition of a
prudential element in standing doctrine, grounds for suspicion remain that ad hoc pressures to authorize or withhold adjudication on the merits may encourage some of the Justices to draw finer distinctions than they would draw otherwise—including finer distinctions than they might think appropriate in applying other doctrines—in determining
whether the injury-in-fact, causation, and redressability requirements are met.”).
Toner is the powdery ink that laser printers use to create images on paper. Lexmark, 134
S. Ct. at 1383.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Static Control, a maker and seller of components for the remanufacture of Lexmark cartridges, developed a microchip that mimicked
the microchip in Lexmark’s Prebate cartridges and therefore allowed
76
remanufacturers “to refurbish and resell used Prebate cartridges.”
Lexmark sued Static Control for copyright infringement, but Static
Control counterclaimed, alleging that Lexmark engaged in false or
77
misleading advertising in violation of § 43(a) of the Lanham Act,
and that its misrepresentations had caused Static Control lost sales
78
and damage to its business reputation. The United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky granted Lexmark’s motion
to dismiss Static Control’s Lanham Act counterclaim, holding that
Static Control lacked prudential standing to bring the Lanham Act
79
claim. The Sixth Circuit reversed the dismissal of Static Control’s
Lanham Act claim, but acknowledged that various federal court of
appeals had adopted three competing approaches to determining
80
whether a plaintiff has standing to sue under the Lanham Act. The
Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide “the appropriate analytical framework for determining a party’s standing to maintain an ac81
tion for false advertising under the Lanham Act.”
B. Prudential Standing in Lexmark
While both parties had focused on the issue of prudential standing as the central issue in the case, Justice Scalia’s majority opinion
questioned whether the very “label” of prudential standing was “mis82
leading.” The Court initially concluded that “Static Control’s allegations of lost sales and damage to its business reputation give it stand83
Justice
ing under Article III to press its false-advertising claim.”
Scalia then observed that Lexmark’s contention that the Court
should nevertheless dismiss Static Control’s claim on prudential
standing grounds was “in some tension with our recent reaffirmation
of the principle that a federal court’s obligation to hear and decide
84
The Court
cases within its jurisdiction is virtually unflagging.”
acknowledged that in prior cases it had recognized prudential stand76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84

Id. at 1384.
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a).
Lexmark, 134 S. Ct. at 1384–85.
Id. at 1385.
Id.
Id. (quoting Petition for Writ of Certiorari, 133 S. Ct. 2766 (2013) (No. 12–873).
Id. at 1386.
Id.
Lexmark, 134 S. Ct. at 1386 (quoting another source) (interal quotation marks omitted).

Oct. 2015]

PRUDENTIAL STANDING DOCTRINE

229

ing doctrine as including the prohibition against third-party suits, the
rule against generalized grievance suits and the zone of interests
85
test.
Static Control argued that the Court should use the zone of inter86
ests test in deciding any prudential standing issues in the case.
While conceding that it had treated the test as a prudential standing
question in prior cases, the Court determined that the zone of inter87
ests test is not truly a prudential issue. Instead, Justice Scalia observed, “Whether a plaintiff comes within the zone of interests is an
issue that requires us to determine, using traditional tools of statutory
interpretation, whether a legislatively conferred cause of action en88
compasses a particular plaintiff’s claim.” The Court favorably quoted the view of Judge Laurence Silberman from the D.C. Circuit that
“prudential standing is a misnomer as applied to the zone-of-interests
analysis, which asks whether this particular class of persons ha[s] a
89
right to sue under this substantive statute.”
In a footnote, the Court observed that “[t]he zone-of-interests test
is not the only concept that we have previously classified as an aspect
of ‘prudential standing’ but for which, upon closer inspection, we
90
have found that label inapt.” As an example, as will be further examined in Part III, the Court discussed how it had gradually moved
from treating its reluctance to hear generalized grievances from be91
ing a prudential reservation to an Article III prohibition. The Court
acknowledged that “[t]he limitations on third-party standing are
harder to classify” as being prudential in nature or based on other
grounds; Part V will explore whether those limitations are based on
92
prudential principles.

85
86
87
88
89
90
91

92

Id. (citing Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 12 (2004)).
Id. at 1387.
Id.
Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see infra Part IV (discussing recent
debate in the D.C. Circuit about the zone of interests test).
Lexmark, 134 S. Ct. at 1387 n.3.
Id.; see infra Part III (discussing the Supreme Court’s evolution in explaining its reluctance to hear generalized grievances from being a prudential principle to an Article III
mandate).
Lexmark, 134 S. Ct. at 1387 n.3; see infra Part V (discussing the Supreme Court’s divided
jurisprudence on whether limitations on third-party standing are prudential in nature or
based on other grounds).
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C. The Zone of Interests in General and in Lexmark
After explaining that the zone of interests test did not belong with
the prudential standing doctrine, the Court next addressed how the
zone of interests test applied in Lexmark and how the test generally
determines whether a plaintiff is authorized to sue in the federal
93
courts. Justice Scalia reasoned that the central issue in Lexmark was
whether “Static Control falls within the class of plaintiffs whom Congress has authorized to sue under § 1125(a). In other words, we ask
94
whether Static Control has a cause of action under the statute.” In a
footnote, the Court explained why treating the zone of interests test
as a question of “statutory standing” and “as effectively jurisdictional”
95
was “misleading,” even though some prior cases had used that label.
Justice Scalia reasoned: “That label is an improvement over the language of ‘prudential standing,’ since it correctly places the focus on
the statute. But it, too, is misleading, since the absence of a valid (as
opposed to arguable) cause of action does not implicate subjectmatter jurisdiction, i.e., the court’s statutory or constitutional power to
96
adjudicate the case.”
Next the Court addressed how the zone of interests test affected
97
Only those
whether Static Control could sue under § 1125(a).
plaintiffs whose interests fall within the zone of interests protected by
the statute invoked, in this case § 1125(a) of the Lanham Act, may
98
use that statute to sue in the federal courts. While the Court has
adopted a broad definition of the zone of interests for suits pursuant
99
to the federal Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), the Lanham
Act explicitly limits itself to false-advertising cases alleging an injury to
100
Additionally, the
a commercial interest in reputation or sales.
Court concluded that the Lanham Act is limited to those plaintiffs
who can establish that their injuries are proximately caused by a de101
The Court held that “direct apfendant’s violation of the statute.
plication of the zone-of-interests test and the proximate-cause requirement supplies the relevant limits on who may sue” under §

93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101

Lexmark, 134 S. Ct. at 1386–89.
Id. at 1387.
Id. at 1387 n.4.
Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
Id. at 1388–89.
Id.
Lexmark, 134 S. Ct. at 1388–89 (discussing Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 551 et
seq.).
Id. at 1389–90.
Id. at 1390–91.
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1125(a). 102 Addressing whether Static Control’s false-advertising
claim was within the scope of the statute, the Court concluded that
Static Control had met the zone of interests test for the Lanham Act
by alleging an injury to a commercial interest in lost sales and damage to its business reputation that were allegedly proximately caused
103
The Court cautioned that it was
by Lexmark’s misrepresentations.
only addressing whether Static Control’s allegations were sufficient to
sue pursuant to § 1125(a) and that it still had to provide evidence of
104
actual injury by Lexmark at a trial.
III. WHETHER THE USUAL RULE AGAINST GENERALIZED GRIEVANCES IS
A PRUDENTIAL OR ARTICLE III BARRIER AND HOW BROAD IS THE
BARRIER 105
A. Taxpayer Suits Are Usually Prohibited Because They Are Generalized
Grievances, But Lexmark Fails to Prohibit All Taxpayer Suits
During the 1920s, before it had explicitly formulated its Article III
106
standing doctrine, the Court in Frothingham v. Mellon held that an
individual taxpayer generally cannot sue the government to challenge how tax dollars are appropriated because his generalized interest in government funds “is shared with millions of others; is comparatively minute and indeterminable; and the effect upon future
taxation, of any payment out of the funds, [is] so remote, fluctuating
107
In its subsequent Flast v. Cohen decision, 108 which
and uncertain.”
allowed a narrow exception for taxpayer suits where federal taxpayers
sued to enjoin the expenditure of federal funds for the purchase of
textbooks and other instructional materials for use in parochial
schools on the ground that such expenditures were prohibited by Es109
tablishment Clause of the First Amendment, the Court acknowledged that the Frothingham decision could be read to rely on either
constitutional Article III or prudential standing doctrine to deny
standing, but the Flast decision preferred to read Frothingham as using

102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109

Id.
Id. at 1393–95.
Id. at 1395.
My discussion of the Akins, Massachusetts, and AEP decisions in Part III is based in part on
my prior work cited in note 1.
See Stark v. Wickard, 321 U.S. 288, 310 (1944) (stating explicitly the Article III standing
requirement in a Supreme Court case for the first time).
262 U.S. 447, 486–89 (1923).
392 U.S. 83, 92–94 (1968).
Id. at 102–06.
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prudential or policy reasons to deny taxpayer standing. 110 For many
years, before Lexmark classified the usual prohibition against general
111
grievance suits as an Article III standing barrier, the Court failed to
clearly explain whether the general prohibition against taxpayer suits
112
was based on constitutional or prudential considerations, although
recent Court decisions had emphasized constitutional barriers to tax113
In his Hein concurrence, Justice Scalia contended
payer standing.
that the Court should overrule Flast and hold that the rule against
taxpayer standing is based upon constitutional standing doctrine and
114
While the Lexmark decision held that
not just prudential factors.
the barrier against all generalized grievances, including presumably
taxpayer suits, is based on Article III grounds and not prudential con115
siderations, the decision did not explicitly prohibit all taxpayer suits
and thus did not clearly adopt Justice Scalia’s goal in his Hein concur116
rence of overruling Flast.
The Lexmark decision’s failure to prohibit all taxpayer suits might
make a difference in future tax expenditure suits. In Arizona Christian
117
School Tuition Organization v. Winn, the Court, in a five to four decision written by Justice Kennedy, distinguished Flast and held that Arizona taxpayers lacked Article III standing to bring an action alleging
that an Arizona statute that granted tuition tax credits to income taxpayers who contributed money to “student tuition organizations”
(“STO”) that used the contributions to provide scholarships to students attending private schools, including religious schools, violated
110
111
112
113

114
115
116

117

Id. at 92–94; see Solimine, supra note 23, at 1042 (suggesting that Flast v. Cohen interpreted
the Frothingham decision as a prudential rather than constitutional standing case).
Lexmark, 134 S. Ct. at 1387 & n.3.
Anne Abramowitz, A Remedy for Every Right: What Federal Courts Can Learn From California’s
Taxpayer Standing, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1595, 1605–07 (2010).
Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 131 S. Ct. 1436, 1441–49 (2011) (discussing
Article III barriers to taxpayer standing); Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc.,
551 U.S. 587, 634 n.5 (2007) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (observing that the
Court “has occasionally in dicta described the prohibition on generalized grievances as
merely a prudential bar,” but explaining that the doctrine “squarely rest[s] on Article III
considerations, as the analysis in Lujan . . . confirms[]”); DaimlerChrysler Corp., 547 U.S. at
344 (refusing to create an exception to the general prohibition on taxpayer standing for
challenges to state tax or spending decisions, and observing that taxpayer standing has
been rejected “because the alleged injury is not ‘concrete and particularized,’ but instead
a grievance the taxpayer ‘suffers in some indefinite way in common with people’”) (citation omitted).
Hein, 551 U.S. at 618–37, 634 n.5; Solimine, supra note 23, at 1045.
Lexmark, 134 S. Ct. at 1387 & n.3.
See Hein, 551 U.S. at 618–37, 634 n.5 (Scalia, J., concurring); infra notes 117–20 and accompanying text (discussing Arizona Christian School Tuition Organization v. Winn and its
implications in future cases).
131 S. Ct. 1436 (2011).
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the First Amendment’s Establishment Clause. 118 The majority distinguished the Flast decision on the grounds that the former case involved actual expenditures by the government that arguably promoted religious organizations, but the Arizona statute did not cause any
injury to state taxpayers. Because Arizona was merely declining to
impose a tax, rather than making an expenditure, any financial injury
to the plaintiff taxpayers was speculative, and any injuries to taxpayers
were not fairly traceable to the State, as the tax credit system was im119
In a
plemented by private action and with no State intervention.
concurring opinion, Justice Scalia, who was joined by Justice Thomas,
reiterated his view in his Hein concurrence that the Court should
overrule Flast and reject taxpayer standing on constitutional
120
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Elena Kagan, who was
grounds.
joined by Justices Ruth Ginsberg, Stephen Breyer, and Sonia Sotomayor, argued that Flast and subsequent cases authorized state taxpayers to bring Establishment Clause challenges to the Arizona statute because otherwise legislatures could use tax expenditures to
achieve the same unconstitutional support for religion that they may
121
not achieve directly through expenditures.
While Justice Scalia’s classification of generalized grievances as an
Article III limitation is inconsistent with the prudential implications
of the Flast decision, the Lexmark decision did not explicitly overrule
122
A future Supreme Court could
Flast or prohibit all taxpayer suits.
overrule its decision in Arizona Christian School Tuition Organization
without overruling the Lexmark decision. Thus, the Lexmark decision’s classification of generalized grievances as an Article III limitation did not completely vindicate Justice Scalia’s argument in his Hein

118
119
120
121
122

Id. at 1442–49.
Id.
Id. at 1449–50 (Scalia, J., concurring).
Id. at 1450–63 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
Lexmark, 134 S. Ct. at 1387–88, 1387 n.3 (2014). It is possible that the Flast decision still
survives as a narrow Establishment Clause exception to the general rule that Article III
standing principles prohibit taxpayer suits, but Flast’s prudential approach to taxpayer
suits is clearly inconsistent with Lexmark’s categorization of the usual prohibition of generalized grievances as arising from Article III. Compare id. (stating usual prohibition of
generalized grievances is based on Article III and not on prudential factors) with Flast,
392 U.S. at 92–94 (suggesting that the Frothingham decision’s prohibition of taxpayer suits
was based on prudential rather than constitutional standing principles). See also Solimine, supra note 23, at 1042 (suggesting that Flast v. Cohen interpreted the Frothingham
decision as a prudential rather than constitutional standing case).
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concurrence of barring all taxpayer suits as unconstitutional under
123
Article III.
B. The Prohibition Against Generalized Grievances Not Involving Taxpayer
Suits
In addition to the controversy over whether the usual prohibition
against taxpayer suits was based on prudential or constitutional considerations, before the Lexmark decision the Supreme Court had been
unclear regarding whether its restriction on non-taxpayer suits alleg124
ing “generalized grievances,” a term which courts sometimes use to
refer to suits involving large proportions of American citizens or voters or to suits where a litigant who has no personal injury seeks to require the government to obey a duly enacted law, was a prudential
125
In Duke
standing limitation or an Article III constitutional one.
126
Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc., for example,
the Supreme Court concluded that a court could deny standing in a
suit involving generalized harms to large numbers of the public because such a suit would raise “general prudential concerns ‘about the
proper—and properly limited—role of the courts in a democratic so127
In its subsequent Public Citizen v. United States Department of
ciety.’”

123

124

125

126
127

See Hein, 551 U.S. at 618–37, 634 n.5 (Scalia, J., concurring); supra notes 117–20 and accompanying text (discussing Arizona Christian School Tuition Organization v. Winn and its
implications in future cases).
Courts have failed to precisely define what constitutes a “generalized grievance.” YACKLE,
supra note 31, at 342 (“The ‘generalized grievance’ formulation is notoriously ambiguous.”); Ryan Guilds, Comment, A Jurisprudence of Doubt: Generalized Grievances as a Limitation to Federal Court Access, 74 N.C. L. REV. 1863, 1884–92 (1996) (“Beyond the uncertainty
about whether generalized grievances are constitutional or prudential limitations, there is
also uncertainty about their precise definition.”).
See Hein, 551 U.S. at 634 n.5 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (observing that the
Court “has occasionally in dicta described the prohibition on generalized grievances as
merely a prudential bar,” but explaining that the doctrine “squarely rest[s] on Article III
considerations, as the analysis in Lujan . . . confirms”); Lance v. Coffman, 549 U.S. 437,
439 (2007) (implying that the ban on generalized grievance suits is an Article III limitation and citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 573–74 for that principle); YACKLE, supra note 31, at
342–44 (discussing the debate in the Supreme Court regarding whether the rule against
generalized grievances is a constitutional rule or non-constitutional policy waivable by
Congress); Mank, States Standing, supra note 1, at 1710–15 (discussing confusion over
whether the Court’s standing cases prohibiting generalized grievances are constitutional
or prudential limitations); Mank, Standing for Private Parties in Global Warming Cases, supra
note 1, at 878.
438 U.S. 59 (1978).
Id. at 80 (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975), partially abrogated by Lexmark,
134 S. Ct. 1377); see also Bradford C. Mank, Standing and Global Warming, 35 ENVTL. L. 1,
21–22 (2005).
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Justice 128 decision, however, the Court appeared to apply a different
view than the Duke Power decision of what constitutes a generalized
grievance shared by many other citizens in determining that a citizen
may assert an injury if the government denies a legitimate request for
information even if many other citizens could request that same in129
formation. The Court stated:
The fact that other citizens or groups of citizens might make the same
complaint after unsuccessfully demanding disclosure under FACA [Federal Advisory Committee Act] does not lessen appellants’ asserted injury,
any more than the fact that numerous citizens might request the same information under the Freedom of Information Act entails that those who
130
have been denied access do not possess a sufficient basis to sue.

The Public Citizen decision did not discuss Duke Power’s rejection of
131
Before Lexmark, the Court
suits asserting generalized grievances.
had never clearly defined the term “generalized grievance,” or
whether the bar against such suits is a flexible judicial prudential doctrine or a firmer constitutional rule, and some of its decisions regard132
ing general grievances were arguably contradictory.
133
In Federal Election Commission v. Akins, the government argued
that the plaintiffs, who sought information from the Federal Election
Commission because the information allegedly could assist their voting decisions, should not have standing because they had endured
134
only a generalized grievance similar to all other voters. The Court
rejected the government’s contention that the informational injury to
the plaintiffs was too abstract or generalized to constitute a concrete
injury or violated judicially imposed prudential norms against generalized grievances because the statute explicitly authorized the right of
voters to request information from the Commission and, accordingly,
superseded any prudential standing restrictions against generalized
135
grievances. The Court distinguished prior cases imposing prudential limitations against generalized grievances by reasoning that it
would deny standing for widely shared, generalized injuries only if
the harm is both widely shared and also of “an abstract and indefinite
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135

491 U.S. 440 (1989).
Mank, Standing for Private Parties in Global Warming Cases, supra note 1, at 878–79.
Pub. Citizen, 491 U.S. at 449–50.
See id. at 440–89.
See YACKLE, supra note 31, at 342 (“The generalized grievance formulation is notoriously
ambiguous.”); Solimine, supra note 23, at 1027 (same).
524 U.S. 11 (1998).
Mank, Standing for Private Parties in Global Warming Cases, supra note 1, at 879.
Akins, 524 U.S. at 13–21; Kimberly N. Brown, What’s Left Standing? FECA Citizen Suits and
the Battle for Judicial Review, 55 KAN. L. REV. 677, 678 (2007); Mank, Standing and Statistical
Persons, supra note 1, at 717.
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nature—for example, harm to the ‘common concern for obedience
136
Akins distinguished between legitimate concrete injuries
to law.’”
and mere abstract harms in defining when large numbers of people
137
may appropriately sue and meet Article III standing principles.
The Court reasoned that “often the fact that an interest is abstract
and the fact that it is widely shared go hand in hand. But their association is not invariable, and where a harm is concrete, though widely
138
shared, the Court has found ‘injury in fact.’” Accordingly, the Akins
decision determined that a plaintiff who suffers a concrete, actual injury may sue even though numerous other members of the American
public have suffered similar injuries:
[T]he fact that a political forum may be more readily available where an
injury is widely shared . . . does not, by itself, automatically disqualify an
interest for Article III purposes . . . . This conclusion seems particularly
obvious where (to use a hypothetical example) large numbers of individuals suffer the same common-law injury (say, a widespread mass tort), or
where large numbers of voters suffer interference with voting rights con139
ferred by law.

In his dissenting opinion in Akins, however, Justice Scalia, joined
by Justices O’Connor and Thomas, contended that Article III standing principles bar even “concrete” generalized grievances because the
Court has required plaintiffs to prove a “particularized” injury that
“‘affect[s] the plaintiff in a personal and individual way’” and has denied standing for all asserted injuries that are “undifferentiated and
140
Because the Akins plaincommon to all members of the public.”
tiffs’ alleged informational injury was an “undifferentiated” generalized grievance that was “‘common to all members of the public,’” Justice Scalia asserted that they must resolve it “by political, rather than
141
judicial, means.”

136

137
138
139
140
141

Akins, 524 U.S. at 23 (citation omitted). At the time of the Akins decision in 1998, the
Supreme Court had not been clear on whether generalized grievances pose a constitutional or prudential barrier to standing, and the issue has been subject to much debate.
Solimine, supra note 23, at 1027 n.14. The Akins decision implied that the rule against
generalized grievances is only prudential in nature, but did not explicitly decide the issue.
See Akins, 524 U.S. at 24–25; accord Mank, Standing and Statistical Persons, supra note 1, at
717 (discussing Akins as treating generalized grievances as prudential rule).
Akins, 524 U.S. at 24–25; see also Mank, Standing and Statistical Persons, supra note 1, at 717.
Akins, 524 U.S. at 24 (citing Pub. Citizen, 491 U.S. at 449–50); Mank, Standing and Statistical
Persons, supra note 1, at 717.
Akins, 524 U.S. at 24–25; accord Mank, Standing and Statistical Persons, supra note 1, at 717.
Akins, 524 U.S. at 35 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks
omitted); see also Mank, Standing and Statistical Persons, supra note 1, at 719.
Akins, 524 U.S. at 35–36 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted); accord Mank, Standing and Statistical Persons, supra note 1, at 719.
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For broader reasons of judicial philosophy, Justice Scalia argued
in Akins that Article III’s “case or controversy” requirement must be
narrowly construed to exclude generalized grievances to avoid interfering with the President’s Article II authority to “‘take Care that the
142
Laws be faithfully executed.’”
It is noteworthy that Justice Scalia’s Lexmark decision commanded
143
a unanimous majority. Three Justices who joined his Lexmark opinion were in the majority in Akins: Justices Kennedy, Ginsburg, and
144
Breyer. It is possible that each of these three Justices has changed
his or her mind and now agrees with Justice Scalia’s dissenting opinion in Akins. For example, subsequent to Akins, the Court, in an
unanimous per curiam decision in Lance v. Coffman, held that four
Colorado voters lacked standing to challenge a redistricting plan for
congressional districts in the state because their suit was a generalized
grievance, since they had no greater interest than any other member
of the public in how the law was enforced and implied that the pro145
The Lance
hibition was based on constitutional standing grounds.
decision distinguished other voter suits, but did not mention the con146
troversial Akins decision, which involved different facts than Lance.
It is more likely, however, that these three Justices joined
Lexmark’s holding that the usual prohibition against general griev147
ances is an Article III limitation while taking the same view in Akins
that voter suits in a factually similar case are either not generalized
148
grievances or are an exception to the rule prohibiting such suits.
Because Akins implied but did not decide that the usual prohibition
149
against generalized grievances was prudential in nature, Justice
Scalia has achieved some success in convincing three Justices in the
majority of Akins to join his unanimous Lexmark decision treating all
150
generalized grievances as involving Article III standing principles.
142
143
144
145
146
147
148
149
150

Akins, 524 U.S. at 35–37 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3); Mank,
Standing and Statistical Persons, supra note 1, at 719.
Lexmark, 134 S. Ct. at 1383.
Akins, 524 U.S. at 13.
Lance v. Coffman, 549 U.S. 437, 439–42 (2007) (implying that ban on generalized grievance suits is Article III limitation and citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 573–74 for that principle).
Id. at 442 (“It is quite different from the sorts of injuries alleged by plaintiffs in voting
rights cases where we have found standing.” (citation omitted)).
Lexmark, 134 S. Ct. at 1387 & n.3.
Akins, 524 U.S. at 24–25.
See id.; accord Mank, Standing and Statistical Persons, supra note 1, at 717 (discussing Akins as
treating generalized grievances as prudential rule).
Compare Lexmark, 134 S. Ct. at 1383 (unanimous decision including Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, Ginsburg and Breyer) with Akins, 524 U.S. at 13 (listing Justices Kennedy,
Ginsburg, and Breyer in majority and Justice Scalia and Thomas in dissent).
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Yet Justices Kennedy, Ginsburg, and Breyer could still achieve the
same result in Akins without disagreeing with Lexmark by treating the
voters’ suit in the former case as either not a generalized grievance
because it involves a concrete injury or as an exception to the usual
prohibition against generalized grievance suits because of the policy
importance of allowing voters to obtain information from the gov151
ernment that could assist their voting decisions.
C. Climate Change Suits By States May Not Be Generalized Grievances
Another important area where the Court may disagree about
whether a suit is a generalized grievance are suits involving climate
change, especially suits brought by state governments. In Massachu152
setts v. EPA, the Court held that a state government had Article III
standing to sue the federal government for its failure to regulate
greenhouse gas (“GHG”) emissions from motor vehicles that arguably cause global climate change, despite the highly diffuse and generalized nature of the harms involved because states are “entitled to
153
special solicitude in our standing analysis.” In American Electric Pow154
er Co. v. Connecticut (AEP), the Supreme Court, by an equally divided vote, affirmed a Second Circuit decision concluding that both
state and private plaintiffs had standing in a tort action seeking GHG
reductions from five defendants, who constituted the largest electric
155
power utilities emitting GHGs in the United States. The Court stated, “Four members of the Court would hold that at least some plaintiffs
have Article III standing under Massachusetts, which permitted a State
to challenge the [U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA)] refusal to regulate [GHG] emissions; and, further, that no other
156
threshold obstacle bars review.” The Court did not discuss whether
the “some” plaintiffs included only state plaintiffs or also private

151
152
153

154
155
156

See Akins, 524 U.S. at 24–25 (treating the government’s denial of information to voter
plaintiffs as a concrete injury in fact because it could affect their voting decisions).
549 U.S. 497 (2007).
Id. at 518–21 (pointing out that Massachusetts owned a large portion of the affected territory, reinforcing the conclusion that the injury to the state was sufficiently concrete); see
also Mank, No Article III Standing for Private Plaintiffs, supra note 1, at 1528.
131 S. Ct. 2527 (2011); see also Mank, No Article III Standing for Private Plaintiffs, supra note
1, at 1528.
See Am. Elec. Power Co., 131 S. Ct. at 2534–35 (rejecting the petitioners’ argument that the
federal courts lacked jurisdiction to reach the merits of the case).
Id. at 2535 (emphasis added) (citation omitted); see also Mank, Standing for Private Parties
in Global Warming Cases, supra note 1, at 873, 894 (highlighting that the Court “took [an]
unusual step” when it explained that it was equally divided on the standing and jurisdictional issues).
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plaintiffs, but some commentators have suggested that the four Jus157
tices may have decided only that the state plaintiffs had standing.
The Massachusetts decision did not decide whether private parties
have standing rights to bring climate change suits against the federal
government or large private GHG emitters. However, the Court implied that private parties may have lesser standing rights when it announced that “[i]t is of considerable relevance that the party seeking
review here is a sovereign State and not, as it was in [Lujan v. Defenders
158
159
of Wildlife ], a private individual.”
In his Massachusetts majority opinion, Justice John Paul Stevens relied upon the Court’s 1907 decision in Georgia v. Tennessee Copper
160
Co., in which the Court held that Georgia had standing to sue in favor of its citizens to protect them from out-of-state air pollution crossing the state’s border because of the state’s quasi-sovereign parens pa161
triae interests in its natural resources and the health of its citizens.
He also declared that the Court had for many years “recognized that
States are not normal litigants for the purposes of invoking federal
162
Justice Stevens reasoned that “[j]ust as Georgia’s injurisdiction.”
dependent interest ‘in all the earth and air within its domain’ supported federal jurisdiction a century ago, so too does Massachusetts’
163
Furwell-founded desire to preserve its sovereign territory today.”
thermore, Justice Stevens concluded that the Court should recognize
greater standing rights for states because they had ceded three important sovereign rights to the U.S. government: (1) states may not
use military force; (2) states are constitutionally prohibited from negotiating treaties with foreign governments; and (3) state laws are
164
Because states have surrensometimes preempted by federal law.
dered these three sovereign powers to the federal government, the
157

158
159

160
161
162
163
164

See, e.g., Michael B. Gerrard, ‘American Electric Power’ Leaves Open Many Questions for Climate Litigation, N.Y.L.J., July 14, 2011, http://www.arnoldporter.com/resources/
documents/Arnold&PorterLLP_NewYorkLawJournal_Gerrard_7.14.11.pdf; see also Mank,
Standing for Private Parties in Global Warming Cases, supra note 1, at 873, 897–98 (pointing
out that the ambiguity in the opinion makes it unclear whether the four Justices were also
approving standing for private plaintiffs in climate change cases).
504 U.S. 555 (1992).
Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 518; see also Mank, Standing for Private Parties in Global Warming
Cases, supra note 1, at 871, 881–82 (summarizing the Court’s view that states are “not
normal litigants” for standing purposes because they have a “quasi-sovereign interest in
the health and welfare of their citizens”).
206 U.S. 230 (1907).
Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 518–19 (citing Tennessee Copper, 206 U.S. at 237); see also Mank,
No Article III Standing for Private Plaintiffs, supra note 1, at 1536–37.
Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 518.
Id. at 519.
Id.; see also Mank, No Article III Standing for Private Plaintiffs, supra note 1, at 1537–38.
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Court applied the common law parens patriae doctrine 165 to retain a
special role for the states in a federal system of government by acknowledging that states can sue in federal court to protect their quasi-sovereign interest in the health, welfare, and natural resources of
166
their citizens.
In his dissenting opinion in Massachusetts, Chief Justice John Roberts, who was joined by Justices Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas and
Samuel Alito, implied that the global problem of climate change was
a nonjusticiable general grievance that should be decided by the po167
litical branches rather than by the courts. Disagreeing with the majority’s interpretation that states possess special standing rights in
climate change cases, he argued that it was inappropriate for the
Court to apply a broader standing test for states because there was no
precedent, statute, or reason to justify giving states broader standing
168
rights. Notably, he argued that states do not have greater standing
rights under the parens patriae principles because Tennessee Copper only
recognized that states enjoy greater remedies than private litigants
169
and did not address the then developing doctrine of standing.
While suggesting that states and private parties should have approxi170
mately similar standing rights, Chief Justice Roberts’s dissenting
opinion rejected the entire field of GHG litigation by either private
171
parties or states because such suits are generalized grievances.
Chief Justice Roberts emphasized that all GHG suits are generalized grievances regardless of whether the plaintiffs are state govern172
He argued that the Commonwealth of
ments or private parties.
Massachusetts’ injuries from climate change failed to meet Article
III’s injury standing requirement because the injuries were common
165

166
167
168
169
170

171
172

See generally Lawrence B. Custer, The Origins of the Doctrine of Parens Patriae, 27 EMORY L.J.
195 (1978) (discussing development of parens patriae doctrine in English common law to
allow English King to act as guardian for children and mentally incompetent persons).
Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 519–20; see also Mank, No Article III Standing for Private Plaintiffs,
supra note 1, at 1538.
Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 535 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); see also Mank, No Article III Standing for Private Plaintiffs, supra note 1, at 1545.
Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 536–40 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); see also Mank, No Article III
Standing for Private Plaintiffs, supra note 1, at 1543–45.
Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 538–39 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); see also Mank, No Article III
Standing for Private Plaintiffs, supra note 1, at 1543.
Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 536–37 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (comparing private associations with states and asserting that, to bring a claim, both must justify that their members
or citizens satisfy Article III standing requirements).
Id. at 535–36; see also Mank, No Article III Standing for Private Plaintiffs, supra note 1, at
1542–45.
Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 535–36 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); see also Mank, No Article III
Standing for Private Plaintiffs, supra note 1, at 1545.
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to the general public, and, therefore, were not “particularized” inju173
ries. Chief Justice Roberts also claimed that the majority’s allowing
generalized grievance suits in climate change cases led the Court to
interfere with the political branches of government, who should de174
cide general questions of public policy.
By a divided vote of four to four, the AEP decision essentially reaffirmed Massachusetts’ central holding that at least states may bring
175
climate change suits. The Court stated:
The petitioners contend that the federal courts lack authority to adjudicate this case. Four members of the Court would hold that at least
some plaintiffs have Article III standing under Massachusetts, which permitted a State to challenge EPA’s refusal to regulate [GHG] emissions;
and, further, that no other threshold obstacle bars review. Four members of the Court, adhering to a dissenting opinion in Massachusetts, or
regarding that decision as distinguishable, would hold that none of the
plaintiffs have Article III standing. We therefore affirm, by an equally divided Court, the Second Circuit’s exercise of jurisdiction and proceed to
176
the merits.

Four Justices concluded that at least “some” of the AEP plaintiffs met
177
The
Article III standing requirements in light of Massachusetts.
“some” plaintiffs referred to in the AEP decision were more likely the
state plaintiffs than the private plaintiffs in that case because the Massachusetts decision only clearly granted standing rights to state climate
178
The Ninth Circuit’s decision in Washington Environchange suits.
179
mental Council v. Bellon interpreted both the Massachusetts and the
AEP decisions to mean that only state plaintiffs may bring GHG suits,
and, therefore, that private plaintiffs seeking to regulate GHGs do
180
not enjoy the same standing rights in such cases as state plaintiffs.
173
174
175
176
177
178

179
180

Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 540–41; see also Mank, No Article III Standing for Private Plaintiffs,
supra note 1, at 1545.
Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 535, 548–49.; see also Mank, No Article III Standing for Private
Plaintiffs, supra note 1, at 1545.
Am. Elec. Power Co., 131 S. Ct. at 2533–35; see also Mank, No Article III Standing for Private
Plaintiffs, supra note 1, at 1553–57.
131 S. Ct. at 2535 (citations omitted).
Id. at 2535 & n.6; see also Mank, No Article III Standing for Private Plaintiffs, supra note 1, at
1553–57.
See Jonathan H. Adler, The Supreme Court Disposes of a Nuisance Suit: American Electric
Power v. Connecticut, 2011 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 295, 309–10 (2011) (suggesting the four
Justices in AEP who found that “at least some plaintiffs” had standing were most likely referring to the state plaintiffs); Gerrard, supra note 156 (same); see also Mank, No Article III
Standing for Private Plaintiffs, supra note 1, at 1556 (same).
732 F.3d 1131 (9th Cir. 2013), reh’g en banc denied, 741 F.3d 1075 (9th Cir. 2014).
Id. at 1146 n.8; Mank, No Article III Standing for Private Plaintiffs, supra note 1, at 1572–73.
See generally Am. Elec. Power, 131 S. Ct. at 2532, 2535 (reasoning, based on Massachusetts,
that at least “some plaintiffs” had standing because three of the plaintiffs were states).
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However, in an opinion dissenting from the Ninth Circuit’s denial of
en banc review in Washington Environmental Council, three circuit
judges criticized the panel decision’s denial of standing to private
181
parties in GHG suits.
Even if private climate change suits are barred, it is improbable
that the majority in Massachusetts or the four Justices in AEP who supported standing for “some plaintiffs” are likely to re-think their votes
in light of Lexmark’s holding that generalized grievance suits are usually barred by Article III standing doctrine. Justices supporting climate change suits can argue that suits by states are not generalized
grievances because states suffer concrete injuries when their beaches
182
Alerode as a result of rising sea levels caused by climate change.
ternatively, they can reason that there is an exception to the generalized grievance doctrine when states protect their quasi-sovereign
parens patriae interest in the health of their citizens and in their natu183
ral resources.
IV. ZONE OF INTERESTS
A. Pre-Lexmark Cases Treat the Zone of Interests as Prudential
Before Lexmark, the Supreme Court treated the zone of interests
184
To insure a plaintiff has an
test as a prudential standing barrier.
appropriate statutory or constitutional interest in a suit, “a plaintiff’s
grievence must arguably fall within the zone of interests protected or
regulated by the statutory provision or constitutional guarantee in185
voked in the suit.” In Clarke v. Securities Industry Ass’n, the Supreme
Court explained that the zone of interests inquiry seeks to include
“reliable” plaintiffs and to “exclude those plaintiffs whose suits are
186
In
more likely to frustrate than to further statutory objectives.”
Clarke, the Court in 1987 stated that “[t]he principal cases in which
the ‘zone of interest’ test has been applied are those involving claims
under the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), and the test is most
181

182
183
184
185
186

Wash. Envtl. Council, 741 F.3d at 1079–81 (Gould, J., dissenting from denial of en banc
review) (Judge Gould was joined by Judges Wardlaw and Paez); Mank, No Article III Standing for Private Plaintiffs, supra note 1, at 1579–81.
Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 522–23, 526.
Id. at 518–20.
Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 162–63 (1997) (describing the zone of interests standard
as a prudential limitation rather than a mandatory constitutional requirement).
Id. at 162.
479 U.S. 388, 397 n.12 (1987); see also Bradford C. Mank, Prudential Standing and the
Dormant Commerce Clause: Why the “Zone of Interests” Test Should Not Apply to Constitutional
Cases, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 23, 58 (2006).
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usefully understood as a gloss on the meaning of § 702 [of the
187
APA].” While acknowledging that the modern zone of interests test
was originally developed “as a limitation on the cause of action for
judicial review conferred by the Administrative Procedure Act,” the
Lexmark decision disagreed with the premise in Clarke that the test was
primarily concerned with APA cases and instead explained that “[w]e
have since made clear, however, that [the zone of interests test] applies to all statutorily created causes of action; that it is a ‘requirement of general application’; and that Congress is presumed to ‘legislat[e] against the background of’ the zone-of-interests limitation,
188
‘which applies unless it is expressly negated.’”
189
In Association of Data Processing Service Organizations v. Camp , the
Court first mandated that plaintiffs suing under the APA show that
their suit is “arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or
190
regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in question.”
Disagreeing with Justice William Brennan’s dissenting opinion, which
contended that the majority’s zone of interests test implicitly exam191
ined the merits of the case, Justice William Douglas in Data Processing emphasized that the zone of interests test does not look at the
merits, but instead is a threshold or preliminary determination sepa192
Berate from whether a plaintiff is likely to prevail on the merits.
fore the Data Processing decision, the Court in Tennessee Power Co. v.
193
Tennessee Valley Authority had denied plaintiffs standing to sue “unless the right invaded is a legal right,—one of property, one arising
out of contract, one protected against tortious invasion, or one
187

188

189
190

191
192

193

Clarke, 479 U.S. at 395, 400 n.16 (discussing the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.
§ 702 (2012)); see also Mank, supra note 187, at 36; Jonathan R. Siegel, Zone of Interests, 92
GEO. L.J. 317, 318, 327–28 (2004) (observing that most, but not all, of the Court’s zone of
interests cases have involved the APA).
Lexmark, 134 S. Ct. at 1388 (quoting Bennett, 520 U.S. at 163); see generally Abbe R. Gluck &
Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside—An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part I, 65 STAN. L. REV. 901 (2013) (providing
empirical data regarding whether congressional staff, when they draft statutes, actually
follow the Supreme Court’s presumptions regarding how the Court assumes Congress
legislates).
397 U.S. 150 (1970).
Id. at 153; see also William W. Buzbee, Expanding the Zone, Tilting the Field: Zone of Interests
and Article III Standing Analysis after Bennett v. Spear, 49 ADMIN. L. REV. 763, 778 (1997)
(“The ‘zone of interests’ test was first articulated in Association of Data Processing.” (footnote omitted)); Mank, supra note 187, at 34–35.
Mank, supra note 187, at 35–36.
See Data Processing, 397 U.S. at 153, 156, 158 (emphasizing that the standing and zone of
interests tests do not look to the merits of a case); see also William A. Fletcher, The Structure
of Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221, 234 (1988) (same); Gene R. Nichol, Rethinking Standing, 72
CALIF. L. REV. 68, 74 (1984) (same); Mank, supra note 187, at 35 (same).
306 U. S. 118 (1939).
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founded on a statute which confers a privilege.” 194 The so-called legal
interest or legal right test confusingly combined both common law
195
and statutory bases for suit.
Rejecting prior cases requiring plaintiffs to demonstrate a “legal
196
interest” because the “test goes to the merits”; the Data Processing
decision clearly differentiated between the preliminary question of
standing and the ultimate decision on the merits, stating: “The question of standing is different. It concerns, apart from the ‘case’ or
‘controversy’ test, the question whether the interest sought to be protected by the complainant is arguably within the zone of interests to
be protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee
197
The Data Processing decision held that the plaintiffs
in question.”
had standing to sue, but remanded all merit issues to the lower courts
to decide, stating: “We hold that petitioners have standing to sue and
198
that the case should be remanded for a hearing on the merits.”
The Data Processing opinion established the fundamental principle
that standing is a threshold question separate from the ultimate deci199
sion on the merits.
In Data Processing, Justice Brennan’s dissenting opinion, which was
joined by Justice Byron White, criticized the majority’s establishment
of a new zone of interests test as unnecessary once a plaintiff demon200
First,
strates constitutional standing by proving an injury in fact.
Justice Brennan criticized the vagueness of what a plaintiff must
201
prove to meet the zone of interests test. Second, he contended that

194
195

196
197
198
199
200

201

Id. at 137–38; see also Mank, Standing for Private Parties in Global Warming Cases, supra note
1, at 920.
See Fletcher, supra note 192, at 226–27; see also Mank, Standing for Private Parties in Global
Warming Cases, supra note 1, at 920; Peter M. Seka, Note, Federal Jurisdiction—The Second
Circuit’s Competitive Advocate Standing Theory: Public or Private Model Theory? A Call for Choice,
14 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 185, 191–92 (1992).
Data Processing, 397 U.S. at 153.
Id.; see also Mank, Standing for Private Parties in Global Warming Cases, supra note 1, at 921.
Data Processing, 397 U.S. at 158; see also Mank, Standing for Private Parties in Global Warming
Cases, supra note 1, at 921.
Data Processing, 397 U.S. at 152–54, 158; see also Mank, Standing for Private Parties in Global
Warming Cases, supra note 1, at 921.
Data Processing, 397 U.S. at 167–68, 170–73 (Brennan, J., concurring in result and dissenting); see also Sanford A. Church, A Defense of the “Zone of Interests” Standing Test, 1983
DUKE L.J. 447, 456–57 (1983) (discussing Justice Brennan’s dissenting opinion in Data
Processing); Mank, supra note 187, at 35–36 (same).
Justice Brennan wrote:
What precisely must a plaintiff do to establish that ‘the interest sought to be protected . . . is arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by
the statute’? How specific an ‘interest’ must he advance? Will a broad, general
claim, such as competitive interest, suffice, or must he identify a specific legally
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the zone of interests inquiry conflated the question of standing with
both whether a statute precludes judicial review for an issue or class
202
of plaintiffs, and, also, with the merits of deciding a case. Thus, he
concluded that the Court should eliminate its new zone of interests
standard and instead only address whether a plaintiff meets the con203
stitutional standing test. Arguably, Justice Scalia in his Lexmark decision sought to respond to the criticisms and problems with the test
first raised in Justice Brennan’s dissent in Data Processing by clarifying
the zone of interests doctrine and removing it from the murky realms
of prudential standing doctrine.
B. Lexmark Defines the Zone of Interests as Determining Which Plaintiffs
Congress Intended To Have the Right to Sue
In Lexmark, Justice Scalia acknowledged that the Court had treated the zone of interests test as a part of prudential standing doctrine
in the past, but clearly stated that the test was not prudential in na204
Instead, the Lexmark decision declared that “[w]hether a
ture.
plaintiff comes within the zone of interests is an issue that requires us
to determine, using traditional tools of statutory interpretation,
whether a legislatively conferred cause of action encompasses a par205
ticular plaintiff’s claim.” Justice Scalia then relied upon the view of
Judge Silberman of the D.C. Circuit that “prudential standing is a
misnomer as applied to the zone-of-interests analysis, which asks
whether this particular class of persons ha[s] a right to sue under this
206
substantive statute.”
In addition to deciding that the zone of interests test is not prudential in nature, the Court tried to provide more concrete direction
207
The Lexmark decision exon how courts should apply the test.
plained that “the question this case presents is whether Static Control
falls within the class of plaintiffs whom Congress has authorized to
sue under § 1125(a). In other words, we ask whether Static Control

202
203
204
205
206
207

protected interest? When, too, is his interest ‘arguably’ within the appropriate
‘zone’? Does a mere allegation that it falls there suffice?
Data Processing, 397 U.S. at 177 (Brennan, J., concurring in result and dissenting); see also
Church, supra note 200, at 456; Mank, supra note 187, at 35–36, 35 n.100.
Data Processing, 397 U.S. at 174–78 (Brennan, J., concurring in result and dissenting); see
also Mank, supra note 187, at 35–36.
Data Processing, 397 U.S. at 178 (Brennan, J., concurring in result and dissenting); see also
Church, supra note 200, at 456; Mank, supra note 187, at 36.
Lexmark, 134 S. Ct. at 1387.
Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)
Id. at 1387–88 & n.4.
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has a cause of action under the statute.” 208 In a footnote, the Court
rejected previous decisions suggesting that the zone of interests test
be classified as a “statutory standing” inquiry and hence “effectively
jurisdictional” in nature and instead reasoned that the statutory
standing “label is an improvement over the language of ‘prudential
standing,’ since it correctly places the focus on the statute. But it,
too, is misleading, since ‘the absence of a valid (as opposed to arguable) cause of action does not implicate subject-matter jurisdiction,
i.e., the court’s statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate the
209
case.’”
Justice Scalia in Lexmark explained that the Court generally presumes that the zone of interests test governs who may sue under all
statutes, that Congress legislates against the background of the zone
of interests test, and that courts analyze a statute to determine which
210
groups are entitled to sue under the statute. He also observed that
the Court in several decisions had liberally construed the zone of interests test in judicial review of administrative actions under the APA,
but cautioned that this liberal approach was not necessarily applica211
For example, as is discussed more
ble to other statutory schemes.
fully in Part II.C, the Lexmark decision observed that the Lanham Act
212
contains a “detailed statement of the statute’s purposes.” While the
Lexmark decision did not answer every question about the zone of interests test, as Part IV.C will explain about the issue of competitor
213
standing, Justice Scalia’s opinion did partially answer Justice Brennan’s complaint in his dissenting opinion in Data Processing that the
214
test was so vague it should be abandoned by explainging that
“[w]hether a plaintiff comes within the zone of interests is an issue
that requires us to determine, using traditional tools of statutory interpretation, whether a legislatively conferred cause of action en215
Because his approach to
compasses a particular plaintiff’s claim.”
the test involves a case by case determination of statutory intent, Jus208
209

210
211
212
213
214

215

Id. at 1387.
Id. at 1387–88, 1387 n.4 (quoting Verizon Md. Inc. v. Public Serv. Comm’n, 535 U.S. 635,
642–43 (2002)) (citing Grocery Mfrs. Ass’n v. EPA, 693 F.3d 169, 183–85 (Kavanaugh, J.,
dissenting)).
Lexmark, 134 S. Ct. at 1388–89.
Id. at 1389.
Id.
See infra Part IV.C.
Data Processing, 397 U.S. at 167–78 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring in result and dissenting); see also Church, supra note 200, at 456–57 (discussing Justice Brennan’s dissenting
opinion in Data Processing); Mank, supra note 187, at 35–36 (same).
Lexmark, 134 S. Ct. at 1387 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); supra notes
88–89, 90, and 205 and accompanying text.
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tice Scalia’s approach to the zone of interests test in Lexmark is likely
to survive even after his departure from the Court because his flexible
methodology would enable a court to reach a desired merits outcome
216
depending upon how it interprets the specific language of a statute.
While a future Supreme Court would probably agree with Justice
Scalia’s Lexmark opinion that the liberal approach to interpreting the
zone of interests in APA cases is not necessarily applicable to other
217
types of statutes, a Court in future cases could apply a liberalized
version of the zone of interests test in at least some non-APA cases
218
without overruling the Lexmark decision.
C. The Battle in the D.C. Circuit Regarding Competitor Standing
In its Lexmark decision, the Court rejected the test used in the
Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits that a plaintiff must be a direct
competitor of the defendant to sue under the Lanham Act, and instead relied upon broader principles in the zone of interests test and
219
The
proximate causation to determine which plaintiffs may sue.
Lexmark decision, however, did not directly address the broader issue
of when competitors are within a statute’s zone of interests. In Clarke,
the Supreme Court clearly emphasized that competitors are usually
within the zone of interests in APA cases to challenge a statute or
220
However, the D.C.
administrative decision favoring a competitor.
Circuit has applied a far more restrictive approach in non-APA cases
to determining when competitors are within the zone of interests to
challenge a statute or administrative decision, but that strict test has
221
been seriously questioned by at least one judge in that circuit.

216
217
218
219

220
221

See Lexmark, 134 S. Ct. at 1388–89.
Id. at 1389.
See infra Parts IV.C and Conclusion.
Lexmark, 134 S. Ct. at 1385, 1391 (discussing the direct competitor test in Seventh, Ninth,
and Tenth Circuits and rejecting it in favor of the broader zone of interests and proximate causation principles in assessing liability under the Lanham Act).
Clarke v. Sec. Indus. Ass’n, 479 U.S. 388, 397 n.12, 403 (1987); see also Mank, supra note
187, at 59–60.
Compare White Stallion Energy Center, LLC v. EPA, 748 F.3d 1222, 1256–58 (D.C. Cir.
2014) (per curiam), cert. granted on other grounds sub nom. Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 702
(2014) (discussing how the zone of interests test is applied to competitors in D.C. Circuit,
especially in environmental cases), with id. at 1267–73 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (criticizing D.C. Circuit’s test for whether competitors fall within
the zone of interests as inconsistent with Supreme Court case law and internally inconsistent within the Circuit’s precedent).
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1. Hazardous Waste Treatment Council v. EPA
Despite the Supreme Court’s declaration in Clarke that the zone of
222
interests test “is not meant to be especially demanding,” the D.C.
Circuit in several non-APA cases has denied standing for competitors,
especially in environmental cases, on the grounds that their economic interests are not within the zone of interests of the relevant stat223
ute’s environmental and health purposes. In a 1988 decision, Haz224
ardous Waste Treatment Council v. EPA, the D.C. Circuit distinguished
Clarke and applied a narrow approach to competitor standing in non225
The Hazardous Waste Treatment Council, a national
APA cases.
trade organization of firms engaged in the treatment of hazardous
waste and the manufacture of equipment for that purpose, petitioned
for review of EPA’s rules concerning the burning of hazardous waste,
including used oil, as fuel, on the grounds that they were insufficiently comprehensive and stringent under the controlling statute, the Re226
source Conservation and Recovery Act (“RCRA”). Three members
of the Council claimed competitive injuries from the proposed EPA
regulations on the ground “that the asserted laxity of the regulations
227
will diminish the market for their high-tech control services.” The
Council argued that its interests, although pecuniary, were “in sync
228
with those sought to be served by [the] RCRA [statute].” The D.C.
Circuit observed, “[i]n essence they suggest that tightening of environmental standards will generally foster not only a cleaner environment but also the member companies’ profits, as it will expand the
229
market for their services.”
While the Supreme Court’s decision in Clarke had suggested a
generally liberal approach to applying the zone of interests test, the
D.C. Circuit in Hazardous Waste Treatment Council interpreted Clarke as
“somewhat unclear” in cases where a competitor argued that its pecuniary interests happen to align with the environmental goals of a
230
statute. According to the D.C. Circuit, Clarke, in applying the zone
of interests test, had employed a balancing test by not requiring “a

222
223
224
225
226
227
228
229
230

Clarke, 479 U.S. at 399.
See cases discussed in Part IV.C.
861 F.2d 277 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (per curiam).
Id. at 282–83.
Id. at 279–80 (discussing the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, 42
U.S.C. § 6901, §§ 6921–6939a).
Id. at 281.
Id. at 282.
Id.
Hazardous Waste Treatment Council, 861 F.2d at 282; see Clarke, 479 U.S. at 399.
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showing of congressional intent to benefit” but by also seeking “more
231
than a ‘marginal[] rela[tionship]’ to the statutory purposes.” Even
“in the absence of an apparent congressional intent to benefit” a
plaintiff, the D.C. Circuit acknowledged that competitor standing
may be appropriate where there is “some indicator that the plaintiff is
a peculiarly suitable challenger of administrative neglect [to] sup232
port[] an inference that Congress would have intended eligibility.”
However, the court concluded that the Council’s competitor interests, even if they were somewhat “in sync” with the statute’s interests,
were too “‘marginally related’ to Congress’s environmental purposes”
233
to qualify for standing.
The D.C. Circuit in Hazardous Waste Treatment Council based its restrictive approach to competitor standing in non-APA cases in part on
the assumption that prudential standing necessarily prohibited some
parties who met Article III standing from suing, stating: “And of
course a rule that gave any such plaintiff standing merely because it
happened to be disadvantaged by a particular agency decision would
destroy the requirement of prudential standing; any party with consti234
The reasoning in the preceding sentutional standing could sue.”
tence is now highly questionable in light of Lexmark’s conclusion that
the zone of interests test is not prudential in nature; however, the
D.C. Circuit could still reach the same conclusion by reasoning that
Congress, in enacting RCRA, did not intend to include competitors,
such as the three members of the Council in Hazardous Waste Treat235
ment Council, to be among the class of plaintiffs entitled to sue.
Nevertheless, the Council’s “in sync” argument should have prevailed
because competitor suits, even if self-interested, frequently serve the
236
environmental goals of RCRA and other environmental statutes.
2. Clean Air Act Cases
Similarly, the D.C. Circuit has denied competitor standing under
the zone of interests test in Clean Air Act (“CAA”) cases. For exam237
ple, in its 2001 decision in Cement Kiln Recycling Coalition v. EPA, the
231
232
233
234
235
236
237

Hazardous Waste Treatment Council, 861 F.2d at 283 (quoting Clarke, 479 U.S. at 399 (alterations in original)).
Id.
Id.
Id.
See Lexmark, 134 S. Ct. at 1387–89 (applying the zone of interests test as to whether Congress intended plaintiffs to be among class eligible to sue under a particular statute).
Hazardous Waste Treatment Council, 861 F.2d at 282.
255 F.3d 855 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
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court held that the purely economic interests of manufacturers of
pollution control equipment seeking more rigorous regulation of
their competitors under § 112 of the Act were not within the zone of
interests of statute despite the argument of the industry coalition that
Hazardous Waste Treatment Council’s denial of competitor standing did
not apply to its suit because the CAA utilizes a technology-based approach to controlling air emissions that differs from the RCRA statute
238
at issue in the former case. The court concluded that the technology-based approach in the CAA did not demonstrate that Congress
intended to broaden the zone of interests to include competitor
standing because there was no evidence that Congress wanted every
source to use the best pollution control equipment, but only to meet
the performance standards of reducing air emissions, as distinct from
adopting the methods of emission control, of the best performing
239
sources. The D.C. Circuit concluded, “[a]s in the [Hazardous Waste
Treatment Council] cases, the Council’s interest lies only in increasing
the regulatory burden on others,” and, therefore, the industry competitors in its case failed to meet the zone of interests test because
they lacked any interest in the environmental health goals of the stat240
ute.
Likewise, in its 2013 decision in Association of Battery Recyclers v.
EPA, the D.C. Circuit held that a corporation could not challenge the
EPA’s failure to impose more stringent emission standards on its
competitors because that interest fell outside the zone of interests
protected by § 112 of the CAA—the same section at issue in Cement
241
Kiln Recycling Coalition. The D.C. Circuit in these two CAA cases ignored the value of recognizing standing for competitor suits that
raise arguments in favor of more environmental protection even if a
competitor is more interested in its profits than in protecting the
242
public health. It is noteworthy that the Lexmark decision discussed
Judge Silberman’s concurring opinion in Association of Battery Recyclers, and also cited a dissenting opinion by Judge Kavanaugh of the
243
D.C. Circuit in Grocery Manufacturers Association v. EPA. The citation
238
239

240
241
242
243

Id. at 870–71.
Id. at 871; see also White Stallion Energy Center, LLC v. EPA, 748 F.3d 1222, 1256–57
(D.C. Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (discussing Cement Kiln Recycling Coalition v. EPA), cert.
granted sub nom. Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 702 (2014).
Cement Kiln Recycling Coalition, 255 F.3d at 871.
716 F.3d 667, 674 (2013) (citing Cement Kiln Recycling Coaliation, 255 F.3d at 870–71).
See id.; Cement Kiln Recycling Coaliation, 255 F.3d 855 at 870–71.
Lexmark, 134 S. Ct. at 1387–88 & nn.3–4 (citing Grocery Mfrs. Ass’n v. EPA, 693 F.3d 169,
183–85 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting)) (discussing Association of Battery Recyclers, 716 F.3d at 675–76 (Silberman, J., concurring opinion). In his dissenting opinion in
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of those two cases in Lexmark suggests that the Court is aware of the
controversy in the D.C. Circuit about the application of the zone of
interests test to competitor standing, because both cases involved
competitor standing in part, although the Court did not directly ad244
dress that issue.
3. White Stallion Energy Center
245

In White Stallion Energy Center v. EPA, the majority of a D.C. Circuit panel followed its precedent to deny competitor standing, but
Judge Kavanaugh wrote a strong concurring opinion criticizing the
D.C. Circuit’s restrictive approach to competitor standing as both inconsistent with Supreme Court precedent and internally inconsistent
246
Additionally, White Stallion Energy
within the Circuit’s precedent.
Center is of interest because it is one of the first cases to address the
247
In White Stalimplications of Lexmark on the zone of interests test.
lion Energy Center, Julander Energy Company, an oil and natural gas
development, exploration, and production company, challenged the
EPA’s decision not to adopt stricter emission standards pursuant to §

244
245
246

247

Grocery Manufacturers, Judge Kavanaugh argued that prudential standing should not be
treated as jurisdictional in nature. Grocery Mfrs. Ass’n, 693 F.3d at 181–90 (Kavanaugh, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that prudential standing should not be jurisdictional in nature, observing six circuits since 1999 have held that prudential standing is non-jurisdictional,
discussing and arguing that the trend in the courts of appeals is to treat the issue as nonjurisdictional). Subsequently, Judge Silberman in his concurring opinion in Association of
Battery Recyclers, Inc. v. EPA implicitly disagreed with Judge Kavanaugh by suggesting that
while prudential standing may not be jurisdictional in some instances, such as in suits involving third parties, it should be jurisdictional in statutory zone of interests cases; he also
argued that the zone of interests test was more properly classified as “statutory standing”
rather than a form of prudential standing. Ass’n of Battery Recyclers, 716 F.3d at 675–78
(Silberman, J., concurring). In White Stallion Energy Center, LLC v. EPA, Judge Kavanaugh
observed in a footnote that Lexmark had “made clear that the zone of interests test is not
jurisdictional.” 748 F.3d 1222, 1271 n.10 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part), cert. granted sub nom. Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 702 (2014).
See Lexmark, 134 S. Ct. at 1387–88, 1387 n.4; infra Part IV.C.
748 F.3d 1222 (D.C. Cir. 2014), cert. granted sub nom. Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 702
(2014).
Compare id. at 1256–58 (discussing how zone of interests test is applied to competitors in
D.C. Circuit, especially in environmental cases), with id. at 1267-73 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (criticizing D.C. Circuit’s test for whether competitors fall within the zone of interests as inconsistent with Supreme Court case law and internally inconsistent within the circuit’s precedent). Judge Kavanaugh dissented
regarding the majority’s holding that the EPA did not have to consider cost in setting
emission standards pursuant to § 112 of the Clean Air Act. Id. at 1258–66.
Compare id. at 1256 (arguing Lexmark is consistent with D.C. Circuit’s approach to competitor standing) with id. at 1272 (arguing Lexmark is inconsistent with D.C. Circuit’s approach to competitor standing).
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112 of the Clean Air Act by requiring “fuel switching” by electric utili248
ty steam generating units (“EGUs”) from coal to natural gas. After
concluding that Julander met the three-part Article III constitutional
standing requirements, the D.C. Circuit next addressed the EPA’s
contention that Julander did not come within the zone of interests
249
test.
While acknowledging that the Supreme Court in Clarke had declared that the zone of interests test “‘is not meant to be especially
250
demanding,’” the D.C. Circuit nevertheless concluded that in light
of its precedent in two § 112 CAA cases, Cement Kiln Recycling Coalition
and Association of Battery Recyclers, as well as the broader principles in
Hazardous Waste Treatment Council, it must hold that Julander was out251
Rejecting Judge Kaside the zone of interests protected by § 112.
vanaugh’s argument that the Circuit’s cases on competitor standing
were internally inconsistent and therefore a “‘coin flip’” about which
precedents to follow, the majority relied upon Lexmark for the principle that “‘the breadth of the zone of interests varies according to the
252
provisions of law at issue.’” The D.C. Circuit then explained that it
must be guided by its precedents interpreting § 112, and not those
applying other statutory provisions, including the APA. Because two §
112 CAA cases in the D.C. Circuit, Cement Kiln Recycling Coalition and
Association of Battery Recyclers, had already denied standing to competitors seeking more stringent emission standards under § 112, the majority believed it was bound by circuit precedent to deny standing in
253
Rejecting Judge Kavanaugh’s argument that a recent Suits case.
preme Court decision had undermined the D.C. Circuit’s strict interpretation of the zone of interests test, the majority responded, “[t]his
court has not read the Supreme Court’s decision in Match–E–Be–
254
Nash–She–Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians v. Patchak . . . to change
255
the zone of interests standard.
Judge Kavanaugh “reluctantly” concurred with the portion of the
majority opinion concluding that Julander did not come within the
zone of interests test; he argued that the D.C. Circuit’s precedent was
248
249
250
251
252
253

254
255

Id. at 1256.
Id.
Id. (quoting Clarke v. Secs. Indus., 479 U.S. 388, 399 (1987)).
Id. at 1256–58.
Id. at 1256 (quoting Lexmark, 134 S. Ct. at 1389 (citation omitted)).
Id. at 1256–58 (citing Grocery Mfrs. Ass’n v. EPA, 693 F.3d 169, 179 (D.C. Cir. 2012); id.
at 180 (Tatel, J., concurring) (arguing that the D.C. Circuit court is bound to follow its
own precedent).
132 S. Ct. 2199 (2012).
White Stallion Energy Center, LLC v. EPA, 748 F.3d 1222, 1257 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
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inconsistent regarding competitor standing and, therefore, “[g]iven
that our case law makes this issue a de facto coin flip, I cannot fault
256
He contended,
an opinion that lands on heads rather than tails.”
however, that “our cases holding that competitors are outside the
zone of interests—including today’s decision—are inconsistent with
257
Judge Kavanaugh arthe governing Supreme Court precedents.”
gued that the Supreme Court in Clarke had explicitly rejected the
D.C. Circuit’s narrow approach to competitor standing in APA
258
Despite Clarke, the D.C. Circuit in non-APA cases such as
suits.
Hazardous Waste Treatment Council continued to bar competitors from
259
suing on the ground that they are outside the zone of interests.
Judge Kavanaugh maintained that the Hazardous Waste Treatment
Council decision wrongly required competitors to provide “‘explicit
evidence of [a statutory] intent to benefit such firms, or some reason
to believe that such firms would be unusually suitable champions of
260
Congress’s ultimate goals.’” He responded:
In my view, that language in Hazardous Waste is difficult to square with
what the Supreme Court said in Clarke and earlier cases. In those cases,
the Supreme Court had specifically said that there does not need to be evidence of an intent to benefit the plaintiff class. In fact, the Supreme
Court said that suit should be allowed unless there was a discernible congressional intent to preclude suit by the plaintiff class. In other words, this
Court’s cases seemingly flipped the presumption in favor of allowing suit
by competitor plaintiffs to a presumption against allowing suit by compet261
itor plaintiffs.

Judge Kavanaugh convincingly argued that the Hazardous Waste
decision is inconsistent with the Clarke decision’s presumption in favor of competitor suits unless there is evidence in a particular statute
that Congress did not wish to allow such suits.
Judge Kavanaugh argued that the majority was wrong to apply a
stricter approach to the zone of interests test for Clean Air Act cases
than the lenient “default rule” favoring competitor suits in APA cases
in Clarke and similar Supreme Court decisions because no language
262
in the CAA suggested that Congress wanted to bar competitor suits.
Judge Kavanaugh emphasized the Court’s 2012 decision in Match–

256
257
258
259
260
261
262

Id. at 1267 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id.
Id. at 1268–72.
Id. at 1269–71.
Id. (quoting Hazardous Waste Treatment Council, 861 F.2d at 283).
White Stallion Energy Center, 748 F.3d at 1269–71 (footnote omitted).
Id. at 1271 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (emphasis in original).
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E, 263 an APA case that did not involve competitor standing, where the
Court:
[R]eaffirmed—in line with Data Processing and Clarke—that the plaintiff
need not be among a class that Congress intended to benefit in the statute at hand. And Match–E further reaffirmed that a wide variety of interests, including economic interests related to the agency’s allegedly unlaw264
ful action with respect to someone else, fall within the zone of interests.

He reasoned, “Given its music and its words, Match–E should have
put a final end to this Court’s crabbed approach to the zone of inter265
ests test.” He concluded:
[O]ur current zone of interests case law is inconsistent and unpredictable. Perhaps most troubling, our cases holding that competitors are outside the zone of interests are inconsistent with Supreme Court precedent,
as I read it. In my respectful view, too much is at stake in the administrative process, for health, safety, and environmental regulation, and for the
economic interests affected by these cases for us to continue muddling
along in this way. This state of affairs should receive a careful examination at some point in the near future. Whether a party can sue in court to
challenge illegal agency action on such important matters should not
266
come down to the equivalent of a coin flip. We can do better.

The White Stallion majority, however, would reason to the contrary
that the Clean Air Act favors reducing pollution to required limits,
but does not necessarily support using the most expensive equipment
267
to do so, which is usually the purpose of competitor suits. Also, the
majority disagreed with Judge Kavanaugh’s assumption that lenient
APA zone of interests cases establish a “default rule” for all cases, except where Congress explicitly bars competitor suits; the majority
would instead require courts to analyze the language of each statute
in determining the scope of the zone of interests, including whether
268
competitors may sue. Finally, the majority did not believe that the
Match–E decision changed the D.C. Circuit’s restrictive approach to
269
competitor suits in non-APA zone of interests cases. The majority’s
view that a different and stricter approach to the zone of interests
may apply in some non-APA cases is arguably consistent with Justice
Scalia’s observation in Lexmark that the liberal approach to the zone
of interests test in APA cases was not necessarily applicable to other
263
264
265
266
267
268
269

Match–E–Be–Nash–She–Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians v. Patchak, 132 S. Ct. 2199
(2012).
White Stallion Energy Center, 748 F.3d at 1272 (emphasis in original).
Id.
Id. at 1272–73.
Id. at 1256–57.
Id. at 1256–58.
Id. at 1257.
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statutory schemes. 270 However, from a policy perspective, allowing
competitor suits that are “in sync” with the public health goals of a
statute would advance the statute’s purposes and, therefore, courts
271
should allow competitor standing in at least environmental cases.
A 2014 Arizona district court decision that relied upon Lexmark in
denying zone of interests standing for economic injuries in a Nation272
al Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”) case is consistent with the
White Stallion majority’s approach denying competitor standing in
273
In Yount v. Salazar,
many environmental cases in the D.C. Circuit.
the district court had initially concluded that plaintiffs with economic
interests in uranium mining had standing to challenge a twenty-year
government moratorium on uranium mining near the Grand Canyon
because their economic interests were within the zone of interests of
NEPA, but the government asked the district court to reconsider its
decision in light of Lexmark’s new approach to the zone of interests
274
test. “Given Lexmark’s focus on legislative intent and the exclusively
environmental purposes of NEPA,” the district court concluded that
the plaintiffs’ economic interests in mining were not within the zone
275
Similar to the D.C.
of interests of a purely environmental statute.
Circuit, the Arizona district court decision ignored the value of competitors making arguments that advance environmental goals even if
the competitor has pecuniary reasons for raising those goals.
As a matter of policy, Judge Kavanaugh convincingly argued that
competitor suits seeking stricter regulation of air emissions are con276
The “in
gruent with the Act’s general goal of reducing pollution.
sync” arguments by the competitors in Hazardous Waste Treatment
Council made a persuasive rationale for sometimes allowing competi277
tor suits even if they are based on self-interest. Accordingly, at least
in environmental cases, courts should recognize competitor standing
as within the zone of interests unless a statute implicitly or explicitly
forbids such suits.
Despite Judge Kavanaugh’s strong concurring opinion in White
Stallion Energy Center, the D.C. Circuit may decline to clarify its appli270
271
272
273
274
275
276
277

Lexmark, 134 S. Ct. at 1389.
Hazardous Waste Treatment Council, 861 F.2d at 282.
42 U.S.C. § 4321 et seq.
Yount v. Salazar, No. CV11–8171 PCT–DGV, 2014 WL 4904423, at *4–7 (D. Ariz. Sept. 30,
2014).
Id. at *2–6.
Id. at *6–7.
White Stallion Energy Center, 748 F.3d at 1271 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Hazardous Waste Treatment Council, 861 F.2d at 282.
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cation of the zone of interests test in non-APA cases and continue to
address the issue on a statute by statute basis. First, the majority in
White Stallion and the district court in Yount both made plausible, if
ultimately unconvincing, arguments that the mere economic interests
of competitors are not within the zone of interests of at least some
278
Furthermore, lower courts may arguably
environmental statutes.
resist adopting a lenient rule for competitors seeking to establish that
they are within the zone of interests because courts frequently invoke
standing and zone of interests barriers to dismiss cases that present
279
Additionally, clarifying the zone of interests
substantive problems.
test may be difficult in light of the wide differences in statutory lan280
guage and individual factual circumstances in each case. It is notable that the Lexmark decision did not adopt a categorical test for
competitor standing, but instead carefully analyzed the facts of the
case in light of the Lanham Act’s stated purposes and broader zone
281
of interests and proximate causation principles.
However, a future Supreme Court might apply a more liberal approach to interpreting the zone of interests in non-APA competitor
suits as it already does in APA cases because the burden of hearing
282
such cases largely falls on the lower courts. Furthermore, at least in
278
279

280

281

282

White Stallion Energy Center, 748 F.3d at 1256–58; Yount, 2014 WL 4904423.
David LaRoss, Despite Judge’s Call, Courts Unlikely To Clarify Key Industry ‘Standing’ Test,
INSIDEEPA.COM (May 30, 2014), http://insideepa.com/201405302472576/EPA-DailyNews/Daily-News/despite-judges-call-courts-unlikely-to-clarify-key-industry-standingtest/menu-id-95.html?s=mu (subscription required) (reporting that an attorney commenting on the White Stallion Energy Center decision and the zone of interests issue in that
case observed that the D.C. Circuit “see[s] a lot of administrative [law] cases, and they
don’t want to deal with the merits of them all the time. . . . In a difficult case where they
don’t want to reach the merits, they can just say ‘let’s deal with this on standing.’”). Because of its discretionary certiorari authority to deny review of cases, the Supreme Court
usually does not face the same pressure as lower courts to manipulate standing doctrine
to avoid deciding cases. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., How to Make Sense of Supreme Court Standing
Cases—A Plea for the Right Kind of Realism, 23 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 105, 125 (2014).
See LaRoss, supra note 279 (arguing “[f]ederal courts are not likely to clarify the application of the so-called ‘zone of interest’ test that plaintiffs, especially industry plaintiffs,
must meet to show standing when they sue over actions by EPA and other agencies” because each case presents unique issues that make it difficult to develop a uniform zone of
interests test for industry competitors).
Lexmark, 134 S. Ct. at 1385 (discussing direct competitor test in Seventh, Ninth, and
Tenth Circuits); id. at 1389 (“Identifying the interests protected by the Lanham Act, however, requires no guesswork, since the Act includes an ‘unusual, and extraordinarily helpful,’ detailed statement of the statute’s purposes.”); id. at 1391–95 (rejecting direct competitor test for broader zone of interests and proximate causation principles in assessing
liability under the Lanham Act).
While more than 10,000 cases are on the Supreme Court’s docket each year, the Court
grants plenary review, with oral arguments by attorneys, in only about 100 cases per term.
The Justices’ Caseload, Supreme Court of the United States, http://www.supremecourt.gov/
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environmental cases, there is a strong argument that competitor suits
are often “in sync” with the pollution reduction goals of the statute
283
even if a competitor is self-interested. Finally, allowing competitor
suits in non-APA cases arguably would not require the Court to explicitly overrule the case by case approach to the zone of interests test
284
in the Lexmark decision.
V. THIRD-PARTY STANDING AND RELATED ISSUES: PRUDENTIAL
STANDING OR SOMETHING ELSE?
In Lexmark, Justice Scalia acknowledged that “limitations on third285
party standing are harder to classify.” In a few cases, the Court had
“observed that third-party standing is closely related to the question
whether a person in the litigant’s position will have a right of action
286
However, “most” of the Court’s cases had treated
on the claim.”
the usual limitation on third-party suits as related to prudential stand287
Because third-party standing was not an issue in Lexmark, Jusing.
tice Scalia concluded that “consideration of that doctrine’s proper
288
If he has
place in the standing firmament can await another day.”
the same negative views about prudential standing expressed in his
289
1983 law review article, Justice Scalia probably would prefer to see
third-party standing limitations treated as ‘whether a person in the
litigant’s position will have a right of action on the claim,” but presumably he could not convince his colleagues to eliminate the last
290
major prong of prudential standing.
A brief discussion of the reasons for limitations on third-party
standing and the exceptions to that doctrine might illuminate at least
some of the pitfalls facing the Court if it decides to address the rationale for that doctrine in a future case. In most, but not all cases,

283
284
285
286
287
288
289

290

about/justicecaseload.aspx. The Court writes formal written opinions in eighty to ninety
cases each year. Id. Additionally, the Court disposes of approximately fifty to sixty cases
each term without granting plenary review. Id.
Hazardous Waste Treatment Council, 861 F.2d at 282.
See Lexmark, 134 S. Ct. at 1388–89 (citing precedent to support a case by case approach of
determining the “range of interests” encompassed by the zone of interests test).
Lexmark, 134 S. Ct. at 1387 n.3.
Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
Id. (citing, for example, Kowalski v. Tesmer, 543 U.S. 125, 128–29 (2004) and suggesting
that the limitation on third-party suits is an element of “prudential standing”)).
Id.
Scalia, supra note 4, at 885 (criticizing prudential standing doctrine as unnecessary addition to Article III standing principles); Mank, Judge Posner’s “Practical” Theory of Standing,
supra note 1, at 106–07 (discussing Justice Scalia’s 1983 article’s criticism of prudential
standing doctrine).
Lexmark, 134 S. Ct. at 1387 n.3 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
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the Court has adopted the rule that a party “‘generally must assert his
own legal rights and interests, and cannot rest his claim to relief on
291
The Court has exthe legal rights or interests of third parties.’”
plained this rule as assuming that “the party with the right has the
appropriate incentive to challenge (or not challenge) governmental
action and to do so with the necessary zeal and appropriate presentation,” but that third parties are more likely to raise “‘abstract questions of wide public significance’” that are better addressed by “‘other
292
governmental institutions’” than the federal courts.
The Court has allowed exceptions to the general limitation on
third-party standing in some constitutional cases involving fundamen293
tal rights. However, the Court has limited those exceptions “by requiring that a party seeking third-party standing make two additional
showings. First, we have asked whether the party asserting the right
has a ‘close’ relationship with the person who possesses the right. Second, we have considered whether there is a ‘hindrance’ to the pos294
sessor’s ability to protect his own interests.’” In cases involving First
Amendment and other important constitutional rights, the Court has
been especially willing to allow third-party suits, but in nonconstitutional areas of law, the Court has been much less willing to do
295
so.
If reclassifying limitations on third-party standing from prudential
standing to some other constitutional or non-constitutional test for
reviewability changed the underlying substance of which third parties
may sue, there would likely be resistance from some members of the
Court. For example, if the Court were to change its current preference for allowing third parties to defend First Amendment rights it
would arguably be more difficult to find plaintiffs willing to challenge
questionable laws restricting free speech rights. In Secretary of State of
Maryland v. Joseph H. Munson Co., the Court allowed a fundraising
professional to challenge Maryland’s 25% limit on fundraising expenses for charitable organizations on First Amendment grounds despite Maryland’s argument that the affected charities could sue di296
The Court
rectly rather than rely on the third-party fundraiser.
291
292
293
294
295
296

Kowalski v. Tesmer, 543 U.S. 125, 129 (2004) (quoting Warth, 422 U.S. at 499, partially
abrogated by Lexmark, 134 S. Ct. 1377).
Id. (quoting Warth, 422 U.S. at 500, partially abrogated by Lexmark, 134 S. Ct. 1377).
Id. at 129–30; Brandon L. Garrett, The Constitutional Standing Of Corporations, 163 U. PA. L.
REV. 95, 147–49 (2014).
Kowalski, 543 U.S. at 130 (citation omitted) (quoting Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 411
(1991)); see also Garrett, supra note 294, at 147–49.
Kowalski, 543 U.S. at 130 (citing several cases).
467 U.S. 947, 955–58 (1984).
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emphasized the value to public discourse pursuant to the First
Amendment rights in allowing a third party to sue:
Facial challenges to overly broad statutes are allowed not primarily for
the benefit of the litigant, but for the benefit of society—to prevent the
statute from chilling the First Amendment rights of other parties not before the court. Munson’s ability to serve that function has nothing to do
with whether or not its own First Amendment rights are at stake. The
crucial issues are whether Munson satisfies the requirement of “injury-infact,” and whether it can be expected satisfactorily to frame the issues in
297
the case.

The Court would be understandably reluctant to reject Munson’s
rationale for allowing third-party suits and make it more difficult to
bring future First Amendment challenges because it reclassified how
it characterizes third-party suits from flexible prudential considerations to some other constitutional or non-constitutional grounds that
are less flexible in allowing third-party challenges. Similarly, in the
controversial area of abortion law, the Court has allowed physicians
to sue as third parties on behalf of their patients who seek abor298
In the area of racial discrimination and civil rights law, the
tions.
Court has allowed white plaintiffs to challenge racially restrictive
299
property covenants that exclude black property purchasers or the
300
In a gender discrimination case,
exclusion of blacks from juries.
the Court in Craig v. Boren held a liquor store owner could challenge
a state law that allowed women to purchase low-alcohol beer at age
eighteen, but forbade males from purchasing such beer until age
301
The Court is understandably reluctant to change how
twenty-one.
it classifies or treats third-party suits without a full understanding of
the implications in a wide variety of cases.
297
298

299

300

301

Id. at 958.
Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 117–18 (1976) (holding physicians have standing to sue
on behalf of their patients for right to an abortion because direct suits by patients might
risk public disclosure of their procreation decisions).
Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 257–60 (1953) (holding white property owner who was
sued for selling his land to an African-American buyer in violation of a racially restrictive
covenant can raise defense that the covenant violates the civil rights of the third-party African-American buyer).
Powers, 499 U.S. at 411–15 (holding white criminal defendant could argue blacks were
excluded from his jury in violation of their equal protection rights from allegedly racebased peremptory challenges during juror selection).
Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 192–97 (1976) (holding liquor vendor had standing to represent third-party men between the ages of eighteen to twenty to challenge a state law
that allowed women to drink 3.2% beer at age eighteen, but forbade males from that beer
until age twenty-one, both because the state did not challenge her standing in the lower
courts and because she faced significant risk of sanctions, including the possible loss of
her liquor sales license, if she sold beer to men between the ages of eighteen through
twenty).
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A possible solution to the issue of whether third-party suits are appropriate would be to recognize that at least some of the plaintiffs in
such cases have a sufficient derivative interest to have a personal and
concrete Article III standing injury, but such a rule would work in on302
The Court has already rely some circumstances and not others.
quired that third parties seeking to assert the constitutional rights of
a first party demonstrate a sufficient injury in fact to themselves from
the asserted constitutional injury such as a doctor asserting the constitutional rights of a patient whose practice and professional relationship with that patient would be affected by the denial of the con303
stitutional right. For example, as the Court recognized in Craig, the
liquor store owner faced significant sanctions, including the potential
loss of her liquor license if she sold beer to males between the ages of
304
The Court in future cases could expand that
eighteen to twenty.
rationale to include loss of sales to such men and accordingly recognize that the liquor license holder would suffer an economic injury in
fact sufficient for standing in her own right.
However, the Court possibly might prefer to retain the current
third-party standing rationale because it focuses more on the constitutional rights lost by the first party whose constitutional rights are
arguably being infringed than on economic injuries that primarily af305
fect the third party. For instance, there is an argument that corporations should not be allowed to assert third-party standing for fundamental constitutional rights affecting their employees or
customers, even if the corporation has an economic interest, because
rights such as the right against self-incrimination are inherently individual and should not be delegated to or interfered with by a corporation since the government may prosecute the individual separately
from the corporation and sentence the individual to prison if he is
306
The Court arguably could limit or even abolish thirdconvicted.
party standing if it took a broader view of when derivative injuries are
302
303

304
305

306

See Brown, supra note 33, at 131–32 (suggesting that some third-party suits based on derivative injuries could be recognized as sufficient for personal Article III injury).
See Garrett, supra note 294, at 148; see also HomeAway Inc. v. City and County of San Francisco, 2015 WL 367121, at *6 n.6 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 27, 2015) (“Some cases list a third requirement for prudential third-party standing, that the plaintiff itself has suffered (or will
suffer) an injury, e.g., Powers, 499 U.S. at 410–11, while others treat that as a separate question of whether the plaintiff has Article III standing, e.g., Kowalski v. Tesmer, 543 U.S.
[125,] [] 129 [(2004)].”).
Craig, 429 U.S. at 192–97.
See Kowalski, 543 U.S. at 129–30 (discussing general limitation of third-party standing to
cases involving fundamental constitutional rights); Garrett, supra note 293, at 147–49
(same).
Garrett, supra note 294, at 148–53.
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sufficient for a personal Article III standing injury to sue.307 However,
one must acknowledge that third-party rights cases involve a wide
range of factual circumstances and that one rule will not fit all cas308
es.
CONCLUSION
Justice Scalia has partially achieved the goal announced in his
1983 law review article of eliminating prudential standing doctrine
because of his view that constitutional Article III standing requirements are the only permissible jurisdictional limitation that can be
imposed by the judiciary on suits in federal courts and that any attempt to add additional flexible judicially crafted prudential considerations to bar otherwise constitutional suits raises concerns of judi309
cial activism. In other words, if a litigant meets Article III standing
requirements, no judicial barrier should stand in the way of his suit,
310
Accordingly, the
although Congress might limit who may sue.
Lexmark decision’s reclassification of the limitation on generalized
grievances as arising from Article III constitutional grounds and not
prudential considerations is a significant victory for Justice Scalia’s
311
However, the Court has not yet explicitly foltheory of standing.
lowed Justice Scalia’s argument in his concurring opinion in Hein
that the prohibition against taxpayer suits is a mandatory constitu312
tional barrier.
Despite Justice Scalia’s apparent victory against prudential standing in Lexmark, a future Supreme Court changed by retirements and
new appointments might revive the prudential implications of the
Flast decision or overrule its decision in Arizona Christian School Tui313
Moreotion Organization without overruling the Lexmark decision.
ver, there is still the question of what constitutes a generalized grievance and it is less likely that Lexmark’s reclassification of generalized
grievances would cause those Justices who were in the majority in
307
308
309

310

311
312
313

See generally Brown, supra note 33, at 131–32 (suggesting that some third-party suits based
on derivative injuries could be recognized as sufficient for personal Article III injury).
Brown, supra note 33, at 130–31.
See Scalia, supra note 4, at 885; see also Mank, Judge Posner’s “Practical” Theory of Standing,
supra note 1, at 106–07 (discussing Justice Scalia’s 1983 article’s criticism of prudential
standing doctrine).
See Scalia, supra note 4, at 885; see also Mank, Judge Posner’s “Practical” Theory of Standing,
supra note 1, at 106–07 (discussing Justice Scalia’s 1983 article’s criticism of prudential
standing doctrine).
See supra Parts II.B, III.A–B.
See supra Part III.A.
Id.
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Akins or Massachusetts, which respectively allowed voter suits and climate change suits despite arguments that such suits were generalized
grievances, to agree with Justice Scalia’s dissenting opinion in Akins
or Chief Justice Robert’s dissenting opinion in Massachusetts to bar
314
Accordingly, the Lexmark decision’s restanding in similar cases.
classification of generalized grievances as being generally barred by
Article III rather than prudential considerations may have a less significant impact on substantive decisions than Justice Scalia would
315
hope.
Justice Scalia was also successful in reclassifying the zone of interests test as regarding which plaintiffs Congress intends to have the
right to sue pursuant to a particular statute rather than a type of pru316
dential consideration. Because his interpretation of the zone of interests test is flexible and depends upon the specific language of a
statute, a future Supreme Court is unlikely to find a need to redefine
the test as involving prudential standing because the Court could
reach whatever merits conclusion it desired within the confines of
317
However, the Court will conJustice Scalia’s approach to the test.
front difficult questions about defining the scope of the test. Even
though Clarke and other Court decisions take a lenient approach to
defining the zone for plaintiffs in APA cases, the D.C. Circuit has often adopted a strict approach to denying competitor standing in non318
Despite Judge KaAPA cases, especially in environmental cases.
vanaugh’s strong concurring opinion in White Stallion Energy Center, it
remains to be seen whether the en banc D.C. Circuit or the Supreme
Court will re-examine cases denying competitor suits in non-APA cases as outside the zone of interests or whether it is possible to adopt a
consistent rule at all when the language of each statute varies consid319
erably. At least in environmental cases, there is a strong argument
that competitor suits are frequently “in sync” with the anti-pollution
goals of the statute even if the competitor sues only for reasons of
320
A future Supreme Court could apply its liberal apself-interest.
proach to interpreting the zone of interests in APA cases to at least
some competitor suits outside the scope of the APA without overrul-

314
315
316
317
318
319
320

See supra Parts III.B–C.
See supra Part III.
See supra Parts IV.A–B.
See supra Parts IV.B.
See supra Parts IV.C.
Id.
Id.
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ing the Lexmark decision’s approach of interpreting each statute ac321
cording to its particular language.
Finally, although Justice Scalia conceded that “limitations on
third-party standing are harder to classify,” that question was not an
322
issue in Lexmark and, therefore, the Court did not address the issue.
He did point out that some Court decisions had apparently treated
the question as a non-prudential issue, but acknowledged that other
323
decisions had addressed the issue as a prudential matter. While the
Court is often strict in denying third-party standing, it has created exceptions in areas such as First Amendment challenges, abortion, and
324
racial or gender discrimination issues. The Court may be reluctant
to reclassify the general limitation on third-party suits from prudential in nature to some other constitutional or non-constitutional rule
until it more fully understands the implications for its cases that allow
third parties to challenge restrictions on free speech, race, gender, or
325
abortions. The Court should not impair fundamental constitutional rights such as free speech to achieve more uniform standing rules
326
that eliminate third-party standing. The Court should strongly consider treating some heretofore derivative third-party injuries such as
economic losses as sufficient for a personal and concrete injury for
the plaintiff to sue as a first party rather than a third party; however,
corporations arguably should not have standing to sue in ways that
327
Third-party
are detrimental to their employees or customers.
standing cases often involve complicated individual constitutional
rights issues that cannot be reduced to a single simple standing
328
rule.
Like most important Supreme Court decisions, the Lexmark decision’s changing of some prudential standing rules and classifications
answers some questions, but leaves many for another day. Because
there were no concurring opinions in Lexmark, it is difficult to know
to whether all members of the Court will completely join Justice Scalia’s approach in his 1983 law review article of eliminating prudential
doctrines and applying only the constitutional Article III standing test
329
in determining justiciability. Perhaps Justice Scalia has won half the
321
322
323
324
325
326
327
328
329

See supra Parts IV.B–C.
Lexmark, 134 S. Ct. at 1387 n.3; see supra Part V.
Lexmark, 134 S. Ct. at 1387 n.3; see supra Part V.
See supra Part V.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See Scalia, supra note 4, at 885; see also supra Part I.B.2.
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battle by at least convincing the Court to reconsider the entire issue
of whether federal judges should have prudential authority to dismiss
cases where plaintiffs have constitutional standing. Yet because
Lexmark does not explicitly bar all consideration of prudential factors
by federal courts, a future Supreme Court might subtly reject Justice
Scalia’s strict Article III standing methodology in taxpayer, climate
change, third-party, voter rights, or competitor suits without overrul330
ing his majority decision.

330

See supra Parts III and V.

